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PREFACE

Senator Symington: Mr. Rumsfeld, when you come before this committee you come before a very friendly committee. It has been
my experience after thirty-one years in the government that you
have four kinds of senators and congressmen. After World War I
a group of people came here who voted for all of the guns before
any butter. And the resistance that developed over the years,
especially incident to the no-win procedures, resulted in another
group coming up who voted for all the butter instead of any of
the guns. Then you have another group who could be the most
dangerous of all, based on my concept of true national security,
who say well we will vote for all the butter and all the guns
and we are sure to come back with a heavy majority, because
nothing could every happen to the U. S. dollar. In that connection
I was recently talking to the fiscal expert of the Senate, and
I told him that the retired military pay between now and the
year 2000 would add up to 300 billion dollars. He said the
figure was too high. I asked the Chief of Staff, Mr. Braswell,
to get me the figures. The memorandum from Mr. Braswell shows
that if nothing is done the accumulated retirement pay that
will go out is not 150 billion, it is not 300 billion, it is
470 billion.
U. S. Congress. Senate. Committee on
Armed Services. Hearings. Nomination
of Donald Rumsfeld to be Secretary of
Defense, 94th Congress, 1st sess. 1975,
pp. 17-18.
In August of 1974, I wrote U. S. Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr., the
senior Virginia senator and T. Edward Braswell, Chief Counsel for the Senate
Armed Services Committee for a good deal of material concerning the United
States military pension system.
The system had intrigued me as a pension planner for many years for
several reasons.

First, the plan itself possessed grave design defects, which

if allowed to exist in private plans would lead the employer corporation to

excessive cost and possibly fiscal insolvency.

Second, with the quadrupling of

the price of oil in 1974 and the creation of a cohesive oil cartel it seemed
possible to predict that the delicate balance of costs-benefits-inflation upon
which the 500,000 private plans rested for fiscal integrity was in real danger
of becoming unseated from new economic forces over which there was no control
and for which we had no experience.

One could foresee a rash of private plan

terminations and also a runaway military retirement system, both of which sadly
took place and are continuing to take place as these words are written.
From the material sent me by Messrs. Byrd and Braswell, mainly documents from DoD and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) plus hearings and
transcripts and statistical data of all kinds dealing with the retirement system
and efforts to contain it, I was able to determine that the subject was worthy
of a major effort on my:part to attempt to provide something of value.
The timing by pure chance was exquisite.
reform had begun in 1971.

Attempts at military pension

It seemed that the appropriate congressional commit-

tees would turn to a final effort within a reasonable time after the blue ribbon
President's Commission on Miltiary Compensation, appointed in 1977, rendered its
report to the President in April

1978.

I decided to try to write in simple language the first in-depth article
on the subject designed for a specialized readership.

The article, "The United

States Military Pension System -- To Halt a Runaway", was published in October
1977 in the CLU Journal, a professional quarterly with a readership of 25,000
specialists from the various fields of financial planning.

From the article

came an invitation to testify before the President's Commission and an opportunity
to be allowed to make a degree of input into the coming political process itself.
ii

The reader will note that throughout the thesis there is the implied
principle that in a participatory democracy the citizenry should and must take
an active role in the spending of funds given by it to the government in the
form of taxes.

We must never again hold the politician in awe or, in the

magnificent words of Dean Raoul Berger during the darkest hours of Watergate,
he will again become awesome.
A sincere debt of thanks is owed to the following for their help and
guidance: to John Outland, my friend and thesis advisor, whose courses I enjoyed
so much

and whose suggestions and criticisms were always to the mark; to John

Whelan who gave me without complaint generous amounts of his time, his library
and his gift of near-total recall; to Warren Nelson who fed me a constant supply
of papers, testimony and reports from his position as Congressman Les Aspin's
legislative assistant; and finally to Gary Nelson, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense and friend, who saw that my source material was always of high
quality including much of his own work.
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I thank them all from my heart.
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The United States Military Pension System
-- Toward a Rational Reform, with
Commentary on the Report of the
President's Commission on Military Compensation

CHAPTER I
Problem and Prognosis

In addressing the subject of military compensation, we
feel that we must first address the financial condition of the
United States government today. We are not speaking of the public debt figure as announced by the United States Treasury, of
712 billion dollars that is announced in the daily financial
statement~
As taxpayers we are much more concerned by a more
awesome figure, the real debt of the U. S. government -- a figure
that now approaches 8 trillion dollars. This figure is not
dreamed up. It is based upon the State of Liabilities and other
Financial Commitments of the United States Government (31 USC
757 f) and reflects the summary of real public debt as of July 1,
1977.
From statement of Sid Taylor,
Research Director, National Taxpayers Union, before the President's
Commission on Military Compensation,
December 21, 1977.
The day is upon us when we can no longer postpone a reappraisal of
our nation's military plan, for it represents a system in a degree of disarray
approaching chaos.

It is a system which provides benefits of a magnitude un-

heard of in the private sector -- benefits which have been judged to be up to
ten times more generous than those provided by private plans and three times
as great as those of the federal civil service system. 1

1 It is difficult to fairly affect a comparison of benefits between pension
plans because of the various features which have different values. It is the
author's belief that the figure of ten is low. The President's Commission
reached a conclusion somewhat close to ten on page 31 of its report. The
New York Times, April 11, 1978, page 22, estimated the difference at ten.
The U. S. News and World Report, April 24, 1978, listed the difference in
lifetime payout as tenfold.
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It is a system which is escalating sharply in cost.

By fiscal year

2000, if left alone, the annual outlay for military pensions will total $34
billion as against $9.5 billion for fiscal year 1978.

However, should the

plan be put on a funded basis, it is estimated that the cost for fiscal year
1979 along would total $16.7 billion.

2

In terms of cost-to-payroll, the military expenditure is approximately
six times greater than the norm in private industry, requiring some 40% to 55%
of military payroll as contrasted with approximately 8% in the private sector. 3
It is to these abnormalities and distortions in costs and benefits that the
author's thesis is directed.
No attempt will be made therein to suggest the emasculation of the
United States military retirement plan or the financial degradation of the men
and women who serve therein.

The author is fully aware of the patriotism, the

Rersonal dedication, the hardship, the separation from family that a military
career often requires of those who chose it.

Nor is the author unaware that

periodically, three times within the last thirty years, the supreme price in
life and limb was extracted from them.

But there can be nothing but an utter

waste of taxpayer funds when benefits of a level such as these are provided in
times so fraught with uncertainty.
While plans of workers in private industry provide a benefit level of
approximately 50% of earnings inclusive of Social Security, the military system

2u. S. Congress Congressional Budget Office. Retirement Accounting Changes:
Budget and Policy Impacts .. Background paper. April 1977. pp. 6-9.
3
Richard V. L. Cooper, Military Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force.
R-1450-ARPA. Santa Monica, California. The Rand Corporation. 1977.

3

yields 75% of basic pay exclusive of Social Security, and indexed to the
Consumer Price Index for cost-of-living adjustments.4
The following table shows two average retirements under the United
States military retirement plan; one for an 0-6 Colonel or Captain (N), and
one for an E-7 Sergeant or CPO (N).

The table is designed to show retirements

with a 5% Consumer Price Index improvement to age 65.

The Social Security

benefit assumes no reentry to the labor force from service retirement to age
65.

The pension is extended to the life expectancy of a modern mortality

table, and the lifetime military payout is indicated.
to pay is also indicated.

The percent of pension

The dollars are in 1977 dollars:
Table 1-1

Effect of Social Security and CPI .on Military Pension
Rank
0-6 Colonel
Captain (N)
Retirement Age . • . . •
Beginning Monthly Pension .
Military Monthly Pension at Age 65
Social Secuirty at Age 65 .
Total Monthly Pension at Age 65 •
Percent Pension to Pay at Age 65
Lifetime Military Payout . . . .

$

52
1,886
3,383
253
3,636
193
1,080,182

E-7 Sergeant First Class
CPO (N) 20-year career
41

$

455
1,467
186
1,653
151
446,392

Source: The table is the author's own.
The Social Security rates are those which
reflect legislation to 1975. The military
pay rates are those applicable currently.

4

The Bankers Trust Company offers the interested reader perhaps the most
complete analysis of private retirement plan statistics. See Bankers Trust
Company, 1975 Study of Corporate Pension Plans. New York. 1975.

4

The President's Commission in its report constructed a somewhat
similar table but designed to illustrate the difference in lifetime payout
between officers and enlisted personnel of the services to those of the military
of other states, as well as civilian private sector employees:
Table 1-2
Lifetime Value of Military Retirement Under Different Retirement Provisions

Retirement Plan

20 Years of Service

30 Years of Service

Life Payout Value

Age
Annuity
Begins

Life Payout Value

Age
Annuity
Begins

$420,000
40,000

43
62

$590,000
135,000

53
62

Officers:
U. S. military
Typical private sector (salary)
Typical non-federal public
(example: municipali~y)
Federal Civil Service
Typical police and fireman plan (a)
West German military (b)
British military
Canadian military (c)

60
70,000
60
90,000
260,000
50
not entitled
43
350,000
43
360,000

225,000
465,000
575,000
880,000 (b)
490,000
550,000

60
55
53
53
53
53

190,000
39
15,000
62
20,000
60
25,000
60
90,000
50
not entitled
not entitled
165,000
40

280,000
45,000
70,000
155,000
265,000
360,000
215,000
260,000

49
62
60
55
50
52
49
49

Enlisted persons:
U. S. military
Typical private sector (wage)
Typical non-federal public
Federal Civil Service
Typical police and fireman plan (a)
West German military (b)
British military
Canadian military (c)

Source: The Report of the President's
Commission on Military Compensation.
Table 3-2, p. 32.
The estimated payout figures in the above table represent
the lifetime value of retired pay in fiscal year 1978 dollars at the
time the person completes 20 or 30 years of service. Social Security
payments are not included in the estimates. For annuities protected
from inflatio~ pensions remain in fiscal year 1978 dollars until death.
When annuities have no CPI protection or partial CPI protection, future

5

pensions are deflated to convert to 1978 dollars. The estimates
assume 4% annual inflation. Estimates assume enlisted members
enter at age 19, and officers enter at age 23.
The lack of inflation protection accounts for a large
part of the difference in lifetime values between the military
programs and the civilian programs. References to private pension plans are assumed to have no protection from inflation.
(a) For 30 years of service it is assumed that an
enlisted person enters at age 20 and retires at age 50, the
earliest age the typical policeman or fireman can retire.
(b) The West German military does not allow retirement until age 52 and does not provide for deferred annuities.
Therefore, estimates for enlisted persons with 30 years of service assume an entry age of 22 with annuity beginning at age 52.
Note: th~ figure of $880,000 [sic] is an error in the Commission's calculations. The German benefit formula contains the
same maximum as that of the U. S. Since the pay is comparable
also and the annuity cannot begin until age 55, the error is
obvious. The figure should be approximately the same as that
for the U. S. for the officer classification.
(c) The, Canadian military does not allow retirement
before age 40. Es~imate for 20-year enlisted person assumes
entry age at 20 with annuity beginning at age 40.
With Table 1-2 the Commission was clearly of the opinion that a great
difference existed between the United States military pension payout as between
officer and employee; and as between enlisted person and worker.

It is the

thesis of this author that the military retirement plan should be reasonable
in benefits and costs and at least in rough parity with the plans of the nonmilitary taxpayer whose taxes fund it.
Origin of Problem
While the military retirement system may now well be in a dangerous
state of imbalance as to benefits-and-costs, it is but a part of a larger problem, that of the entire pension concept.
pension systems in America.

There are three basic types of

They are the private sector, non-government

plans; the governmental-administered plans containing the railroad workers,

6

ederal civilian employees, state and local employees and the military; the
hird system is the Social Security old age plan (OASDI). 5
Table 1-3

Plan

Number of Persons Covered

Private plans (a)
Railroad Retirement
Federal civilian employees
State and local employees
Social Security System
Military

42,000,000
1,600,000
4,000,000
11,000,000
109,000,000
2,100,000

Source: American Council of Life
Insurance, Pension Facts 1976.
New York. 1977.
(a) Of the 42,000,000 persons indicated, some 10,000,000 are
members of profit sharing plans, thus leaving the pension
membership at:over 30,000,000.
Two events occurred oddly within thirty-six months of each other in
1974 to bring into focus. the peril which now confronts the American pension
systems.

The first was the Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)

which was signed into law by President Gerald Ford on Labor Day of that year.
It sought to mandate monetary protections to workers in the form of strict
funding standards of their plans by their employers and in this respect was
entirely laudable.

However, the timing of the passage of this extremely complex

legislation was unfortunate as it coincided roughly with the Arab oil embargo,
the quadrupling of oil prices, a major recession and severe inflation.

Under

prior pension law, the Internal Revenue Service had historically taken a conciliatory attitude toward private employers who either from desire or necessity

5American Council of Life Insurance, Pension Facts 1976.
This source is excellent for pension data through 1975.

New York. p. 19.
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had allowed their defined benefit pension plans to become underfunded.

Defined

benefit plans, numbering some 400,000,cover the major portion of the labor
force.

6

These plans provide definite, ascertainable benefits which are com-

puted by formula.

The military plan is of this type.

However, the military

plan is unfunded, i.e., the benefits are paid each year from the general revenues
of the government.

Also unfunded or severely underfunded are many plans in the

public systems, i.e., the plans of the counties, cities and states.
Also in long range danger is the fiscal integrity of the Social
Security old age system (OASDI).

This condition was temporarily alleviated

when on December 20, 1977, President Carter signed into law the largest peace
time tax increase in history.

This measure mandated a series of increases

beginning in 1979 for Social Security payroll taxes which will raise 227
million dollars of additional revenue in the years 1979 through 1987.

Its

stated purpose was to end the deficits which had been building in the Social
Security trust funds.

Under present law, the disability trust fund would be

depleted by 1979, the old age trust fund by 1982.

In reality, this shoring

up of the largest of all the public systems foretold of the problems and dangers
which now exist across the entire spectrum of all the systems -- private as well
as public -- problems which are only now beginning to be defined and problems
for which there exist at present little or no consensus of thought for remedial
action.
The problems now facing the private sector funded plans (but underfunded) may be described so that the reader may also understand a major part

6The actual figure is, at present unknown. Prior to the passage of ERISA,
there were approximately 470,000 defined benefit pension plans. Due to the
constraints of the Act plus the recession of 1973, there is the distinct possibility that almost one-third of these plans have been or are now being terminated.
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of the reason for the escalation of the costs of the unfunded public plans
such as that of the military.

For the major reason -- the inflationary wage

and pension increase -- is a common thread which runs through the fabric of
both the systems, threatening the employer with a plan curtailment or termination in the case of the former, and the taxpayer base of the nation with
excessive costs in the case of the latter. 7
The optimum form of pension -- or so it has been thought
fixed benefit, final average-pay plan.

is the

Here a definite benefit is provided

by formula upon a percentage of pay as it exists just prior to retirement.
These plans worked with success during period of low inflation, i.e. when
average yearly increases were 2% to 2.5% to 3%, for the following reasons:
When an actuary calculates the cost of a defined benefit, final
pay pension plan which ±nvolves determining the annual contribution rate
needed to support the plan, he must make assumptions concerning many future
events.

Among these events are mortality, turnover of employment due to

severance, age at retirement, rate of return on invested reserves, and career
salary increases.

In general he makes no assumption regarding the rate of

inflation, but when inflation is in the 2% to 2.5% range, there is room in the
other assumptions regarding the rate of investment yield to accommodate that
degree of rise.

In effect, the plans are open-ended; the costs are never pre-

dictible; at best it is only with difficulty that they can be made subject to
long range planning.

Rates of inflation higher than expected upset the delicate

balance between what can and what cannot be planned.

7For a superb in depth discussion of the current state of the private pension
system, the interested reader should read Robert D. Paul, "Can Private Pension
Plans Deliver?", Harvard Business Review, October 1974, pp. 1-8. The author, at
the point of the beginning of a new plateau in inflation, predicts with accuracy
what is apparent four years later.
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For example, a typical assumption might be that salaries could be
projected to rise an average of 2% to 3% per year.
increases the employer contribution.

This is a projection which

With a 3% salary progression, a partici-

pant who starts employment at $5,000 per year is assumed to be earning $14,000
prior to retirement 35 years later; an employee who enters employment at
$10,000 is progressed to $28,000 and so on.
cost calculation.

This increase is built into the

So, however, is the yield on invested reserves which is

currently figured at about 6%.

Actually, the yield has normally been 2% or

3% higher than_ the assumption, and this difference historically could cover
minimal inflation so long as it was in the 2% to 2.5% range.
But in 1973 the CPI rose 9.4%.
nomics.

We had entered a new world of eco-

The age of cheap energy had come to an abrupt halt.

Between 1968 -

1975, for example, the cost-of-living adjustments for the retirees of the
military pension system averaged 8.5% per year while the average basic pay
increase for the same period averaged 10.5%. 8

If in the next decade the rate

of inflation is 5% to 10%, pension plans now in effect will require investment
returns of 10% to 13% a year to maintain costs at anywhere near a level percent of payroll.
The increase in pension cost from pay increases flowing from the new
world of inflation is striking.

For instance, in a typical defined benefit

pension plan, military or private sector, assume that a 25-year old participant
enters plan membership with a starting salary of $8,000.

The plan provides a

8 For the interested reader, see concise description of the military system,
examples and pay ranges of personnel as well as retirement pay by rank and years
of service in the Uniformed Services Almanac published each year. See page 44
of the 1977 Uniformed Services Almanac. Washington, D. C. 1977.
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pension at retirement of 50% of final-average salary averaged over the last
five years of employment.

If the salary increases are in range of 2% to 3%

per year, the amount necessary to fund the pension would be $84,900.

But

if additional increases of 5% or 7.5% are granted at different times to offset inflation, the amount needed for that participant would soar to between
$325,000 to $600,000 plus. 9

"In our inflationary future", notes author Paul

"employees and employers -- in fact, the society as a whole -- will be faced
with apparently irreconcilable alternatives: automatic cost-of-living increases
in pensions (and pension costs) versus fixed benefits (with declining purchasing power).

The economy may not be able to support the first; society may not

be able to accept the second.

A question is raised: can our pension promises

be kept? 1110
;

The reader may at this point suspect that he has been led into an
unnecessary foray involving an over-exposure of basic pension planning mixed
with fragments of rudimentary economics.

But it has been for a purpose, since

a degree of familiarity with retirement planning in general will be of help to
the interested reader.

What has been suggested is that a pension plan is a

device which is uniquely ill-equipped to cope with high and mounting inflation.
In the private sector thousands of plans have been and are being terminated
because of it -- in large part.
same pressures.

The plan of the military is subject to the

However, the United States military retirement system, of

course, will not be terminated nor will the plans of the other public systems.
This thesis suggests that the taxpayer base of the nation is the de facto

9

Paul, op. cit., p. 3, Exhibit 1.

lOibid., p. 6.
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employer of these systems.

It is, therefore, in the public's interest to see

that the plans are kept reasonable in benefits and costs.
than a duty. 11

11

Indeed, it is no less

The author was gratified to see that the President's Commission on
Military Compensation was of the same opinion. Its core recommendation was
for a realignment of the military benefit structure downward. Its reasoning
was that the present disparity in benefits resulted in an inequity. Report
of the President's Commission on Military Compensation. Washington, D. C.,
Government Printing Office, 1978.

12

CHAPTER II
Background and Description of Present Pension System

The current system was originally intended to keep
Federal pay (both military and civilian) competitive with wages
in the civilian sector, but it has evolved to the point where
far more than necessary is paid. Summing all the components of
the compensation package reveals that military officers, for
example, earn about 70 percent more and enlisted personnel
about 30 percent more, than comparably aged and educated civilian
workers. This did not happen by design but by accident.
Richard V. L. Cooper, Military
Manpower and the All-Volunteer
Force. The Rand Corporation. 1977.
The American military nondisability pension plan is technically
extremely simple. 1

In r~tirement plan language it is a defined benefit pen-

sion plan with a unit benefit formula which provides a monthly benefit of
2.5% of final basic pay times years of service.

The benefit is in the form

of a life annuity, and it commences immediately upon retirement which can be
at any time (for most grades and ranks) between the 20th and 30th years.

It

is not off set by the applicable Social Security benefit and is indexed for
cost-of-living adjustments to the CPI.
system is unfunded.

Benefits vest at the 20th year.

The

Thus, applications of the benefit formula to a 20-year

1Title 10; United States Code. Military retirement is, of course, a part
of compensation and, as such, was expressly delegated to the legislative branch
by the framers in Article one, Section eight of the Constitution. It is not
unusual, however, for inquiries into potentially volatile and explosive issues
such as military pension reform to be spearheaded by a blue ribbon President's
Commission. President Kennedy appointed a similar commission to define the
parameters of private pension reform in March of 1962.
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career will produce a benefit of 50% of final basic pay while a benefit of
75% of basic pay is produced for a career of 30 years.
The compensation package of the military is extremely complex,
comprising some 30 odd items. 2

It is largely for this reason that the

military man has never known exactly what he made and indeed today bases a
portion of his resistance to any proposed changes in his retirement to this
lack of understanding.

His pension benefits, however, are based upon his

main cash item called basic pay.
Most analysts, as well as the author, choose the middle sixties as
the point to begin any examination of the present compensation-retirement
system.

It is about at that time that the ratio of military pay to compar-

able civilian pay stood at its lowest.

Also it was then that American involve-

ment in Southeast Asia was begun in earnest.

A final reason for choosing the

mid-sixties as a point of departure is that from the end of World War II
through the 1950s there were relatively few changes in compensation rates and
retirement policies, the main ones being the introduction of reenlistment
bonuses in 1952, the Civilian Health and Medical Program for the Uniform
Services (CHAMPUS) in 1956, and proficiency pay in 1958.

3

2
For excellent description of the items which are included as compensation
for the American military see Martin Binkin, The Military Pay Muddle.
Washington, D. c. The Brookings Institute. 1975. See also Report of the
President's Connnission on Military Compensation. Washington, D. C.:
Government Printing Office, 1978. p. 9.
3Richard v. L. Cooper, Military Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force.
Santa Monica, California. The Rand Corporation, 1977. P· 259.
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Retirement and Pay Prior to Vietnam
In 1964 basic pay and retirement at representative grades and ranks
were as indicated in Table 2-1, which shows total cash pay and basic pay for
a 20 and 30-year career.

The total pay and cash allowances column in Table

2-1 reflects the disgraceful level of military pay in effect in 1964.
Table 2-1
1964 Domestic Duty Pay and Pension (a)

Grade
0-6 Colonel or
Captain (N)
0-4 Major or
Lt. Commander (N)
0-3 Captain or
Lieutenant (N)
E-6 Staff Sgt. or
CPO (N)
E-5 Sgt. or
Petty Officer
2nd Class (N)
E-4.Corporal or
Petty Officer
3rd Class (N) (c)
E-3 Private
1st Class or
Seaman Recruit (N)

Total Pay
and Cash
Allowances

Monthly
Basic
Pay (b)

Mo. Pension
20 Years
Service

Mo. Pension
30 Years
Service

$1,163

$945

$473

$814

933

740

370

555

818

640

320

480

478

330

165

248

423

280

140

210

358

215

108

161

308

165

83

124

Source:

Uniformed Services Almanac. op. cit.

Military pay for enlisted personnel during their first two years of
service had, by 1965, fallen to about half the comparable civilian rate.

4

Indeed,

when the Gates Commission rendered its recommendations to the President in 1969,
military pay was still substandard, especially when considered as a mechanism
for encouraging an all-volunteer army.

4

Ibid., p. 103.

The commission noted:
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Military compensation in the early years of service is now
so low that it will not sustain an all-volunteer force of
the quality desired. Until that condition is corrected an
all-volunteer force cannot be realized.5
It is interesting as well to note in historical perspective the comparison
between compensation of the military to compensation of the civilian sector.
Table 2-2 sets forth the comparison of enlisted earnings to civilian pay in
manufacturing.
Table 2-2
Comparison of Annual Military Enlisted Earnings
with Average Annual Earnings in Manufacturing
Annual Military
Pay & Allowances

Period
Civil War (1865)
Spanish-American War (1898)
World War I (1918)
World War II (1945)
Korean War (1952)
1960
1965

427
444
870
1,587
2,584
3,034
3,567

$

Manufacturing
Earnings

$

410
394
980
2,469
3,721
5,020
6,130

Percent of
Forces Drafted
2
0
59
61
27
15
16

Source: Richard V. L. Cooper. Military
Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force.
Santa Monica, California. The Rand Corporation, 1977. Table 4-1. p. 52.
The reader will note that in 1965, the year of the beginning of the Vietnam
ground involvement, military pay to civilian manufacturing was low by a factor
of almost one half.

5

.
Ibid., p. 107.
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The second half of the sixties brought many changes in military compensation, including retirement.

Whereas military pay had been increased at

only infrequent intervals during the 1940's and 1950's, 1963 marked the
beginning of annual pay increases for career military personnel.

New recruits,

whose pay had been frozen since 1952, began to receive annual pay increases
staring in 1966.
The President's Commission in its report traces the origin of marked
retirement cost increases during this period:
Much of the attention given to retirement has arisen
simply because of the sheer magnitude of retired pay costs. In
fiscal year 1964, retired pay amounted to $1.2 billion; in fiscal year 1978 retired pay outlays are estimated at $9.2 billion.
The fiscal year 1978 figures represents 8% of the defense budget
compared with 2% in fiscal year 1964. This significant growth
has occurred primarily as a result of three factors: more retirees,
higher military pay and inflation. The Congressional Budget Office
has estimated that~36% of the nondisability retired pay growth
between fiscal 1966 and fiscal 1976 was attributable to increases
in the number of retirees, 22% to military pay raises, and 42% to
CPI increases.6
What the report did not

~ttempt

cost is more interesting.

to cover in this area of pay-raise-to-pension

As was seen in Chapter I, the dynamics of the effects

of substantial increases in the payroll in a defined benefit plan are destablizing.

Even three percent per year pay increases steadily and substantially raise

costs.

Funding to a $84,900 lump-sum benefit with such a salary scale assumption

translates to a sum needed at retirement of between $325,000 to $600,000 should
the salary increase become 5% to 7.5% per year.

It should not be forgotten that

the increase in the number of nondisability retirees (from 398,000 in fiscal

6

Report of the President's Commission on Military Compensation.
D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1978, pp. 25-26.

Washington,

17
year 1966 to 917,000 in fiscal year 1976) which resulted principally from the
World War II and Korean War build-up, has passed.

Also the extremely large

military basic pay raises which occurred from 1966-76 to correct the imbalance
of military to civilian compensation are not likely to be repeated.

What is

left then to cause a near half-trillion dollar payout projected between now
and fiscal year 2000 in the absence of pension reform is the effect of the
inflationary wage increase feeding the CPI cost-of-living adjustment after
retirement.7
Perhaps the most controversial and substantive compensation increase,
and the one which most affected the retirement benefit, was the Rivers Amendment passed in 1967.

It

should be remembered that in 1961 the "comparability"

pay principle for civilian employees of the federal government had been legislated under the Federal:Salary Reform Act whereby the civil servant was paid
at a level comparable to private sector wages and salaries.

This is important

in the context of the Rivers Amendment which tied military pay to that of the
civilian federal employee to be expressed in percentages.

The Rivers Amend-

ment, however, dictated that the entire increase be applied as a percentage to
basic pay.

Basic pay, the main cash item, represents only about 75% of RMC

(Regular Military Compensation) which is the total military pay and which is
defined as the sum of basic pay, quarters and subsistence allowances and the
tax advantage related to the tax exempt status of the allowanc·es. 8

However,

7

The estimate of 470 billion dollars to be disbursed between now and fiscal
year 2000, referred to at the beginning to Chapter I was predicted in a 5% rate
of inflation, an extremely optimistic rate under any political or economic
scenario known to the author at this time.
8

For excellent description of military compensation in general and illustrative examples at all grades and ranks, see 1977 Uniformed Services Almanac.
Moore and Moore, Inc., Washington, D. C.

18
to keep the percentage increase for

R.~C

comparable to that for federal civilians,

every 4% increase in federal civilian pay became a 5% increase in basic pay.
Since the benefit formula of the retirement plan is applied to basic pay, the
retirement plan adjustment was unnecessarily high, thus providing an unintended
windfall.
In addition to the Rivers Amendment, so-called "catch up" pay raises
for career military personnel were put into effect during the period of 1967
to 1969 to keep military pay in line with private sector wages and salaries.
The chronology of events from the end of World War II to the present time is
as follows:
Table 2-3
Chronology of Major Factors Affecting Defense Manpower Compensation
1946-48
1952
1956
1958
1962
1963
1965
1966
1966
1966
1967
1967-69
1969
1970
1971
1971
1971
1972
1975-76
1976

20-year military retirements Reenlistment bonus
Civilian Health and Medical Program for the Uniformed Service
Proficiency pay program
Federal Salary Reform Act: Beginning of GS "comparability"
Beginning of annual pay increases for career military
Cost-of-living adjustments for federal retired pay
Beginning of annual pay increases for military recruits
Variable reenlistment bonus
Major revisions to CHAMPUS
''Rivers Amendment 11 : Comparable pay increase for military
"Catch-up" pay raises for career military
"1% kicker" for adjusting federal retired pay
Introduction of "automatic" annual federal pay increases
AVF pay increase for f irst-termers
Substantial pay increase (BAQ) for career military
Authorization for enlistment bonus & other AVF-related special pays
Double pay increase for federal employees (January and October)
Pay "caps" for federal employees
Elimination of "1% kicker"
Source: Richard V. L. Cooper. Military
Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force.
Santa Monica, California. The Rand Corporation. 1977, Table 11-2.
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From the events listed in Table 2-3 the reader can see that increasing manpower
costs, which have risen from $19 billion in fiscal year 1956 to $59.6 billion
in fiscal year 1976, were the result of the individual and cumulative effects
of many different policy decisions implemented since the end of World War II.
By fiscal year 1977, the rate of pay and retirement had changed
dramatically.

No longer were the lower grades of enlisted personnel earning

a substandard wage and no longer did a military retiree face a "second career"
from necessity rather than choice.

The President's Commission may have been

influenced to some extent by this when it stated in Recommendation 7 that no
Table 2-4
1977 Domestic Duty Pay and Pension

Grade
0-6 Colonel or
Captain (N)
0-4 Major or
Lt. Commander (N)
0-3 Captain or
Lieutenant (N)
E-6 Staff Sgt. or
CPO (N)
E-5 Sgt. or
Petty Officer
2nd Class (N)
E-4 Corporal or
Petty Officer
3rd Class (N)
E-3 Private
1st Class or
Seaman Recruit (N)

Total Pay
and Cash
Allowances

Monthly
Basic
Pay

Mo. Pension
20 Years
Service

Mo. Pension
30 Years
Service

$2,574

$2,190

$1,095

$1,886

2,040

1, 715

858

1,287

1,781

1,483

714

1,112

984

800

400

601

848

680

340

510

712

564

282

423

622

494

247

371

Source: 1977 Uniformed Services Almanac.
Moore & Moore, Inc., Washington, D. C.
military old age annuities should be paid to former military members while they
are employed by the federal Civil Service.

On balance DoD estimates show that
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between the years 1964 and 1976 military manpower costs increased approximately
143% per person.
From examination and comparison of Tables 2-1 and 2-4 it is a simple
matter to see what has caused the sharp growth in the cost of military retirement.

The benefit formula of 2.5% produced a

50% of pay benefit in 1964 but

the dollar value was small, ranging from $473 per month for a
years of service to $165 per month for a staff sergeant.

c~lonel

with 20

However, by 1977 the

same pensions had become $1,095 and $400 and payable at extremely early ages.
The percent value cost of an annuity becomes progressively higher as
its starting age is advanced.

For instance, approximately $1,100 is required

to produce $10 a month starting·at age 65 but $1,900 is required at age 40 which
is close to the average retirement age for ·enlisted personnel. 9
Scope and Cost of Present System
In Chapter I it was briefly noted that the present outlay for military
retirement is $9.5 billion and if left alone will equal $34 billion by fiscal
year 2000.
retirees.

These funds are currently disbursed to some 1.1 million military
The average age of the fiscal year 1975 retiree was 46 for an officer

who had served 25 years, and 41 years of age for enlisted personnel who had
served an average of 22 years.
The projected cost of the current system can be expressed in either
of two ways.

The first method is in current dollars, i.e., dollars of the year

in which the figure is cited and increased by the rate of inflation selected.

9Among the 1.1 million military retirees outstanding today, the average
enlisted grade at retirement is the E-7; i.e., Air Force master sergeant, Army
sergeant first class, Navy chief petty officer, and Marine Corps gunnery
sergeant. The average officer retires at the rank of o~5, i.e., Air Force
Lt. Col.; Army Lt. Col., Marine Corps Lt. Col., and Navy Commander.
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It is this method that the taxpayer should insist be used in all government
studies and projections of future cost increases of any type, the reason being
that it is in current dollars that taxes are levied.

In other

word~

governmen-

tal agencies should be required to express their requests for funds for goods
and services in the same dollars that the taxpayer base of the nation possesses
with which to meet those requests; and to show projected cost increases in the
same manner.

And, of course, it is this method that shows most clearly the

effects of inflation.
Constant dollar projections do the opposite.

This is the method

most often used by DoD, and it masks inflation by subtracting from the increase
each year the rate of inflation used.

Witness, for example, the following

exchange during the fiscal year 1975 Military Procurement hearings of the
Senate Armed Services Committee. 10
Senator Byrd. In your prepared remarks, Mr. Secretary, you state
that the military fiscal year 1975 budget in constant dollars is
smaller than the fiscal year 1964 budget of a decade ago?
Secretary Schlesinger.
Senator Byrd.
conclusion?

Yes, sir.

What inflation factor did you take to arrive at that

Secretary Schlesinger. I don't have a chart that is handy on that
Senator, but pay increases between 1964 and 1975 are on the order
of 178 percent.
Senator Byrd. But you are speaking in constant dollars. What I am
getting at is, I assume what you mean is if there had been no inflation, is that what you meant? When you say "constant dollars",
doesn't that mean eliminating the inflation factor?
Secretary Schlesinger.

10

Yes, sir.

Since it is inconceivable that Harry Byrd, the financial watchdog of
the Senate, is ignorant of the use of constant versus current dollars in projecting increased costs, the reason for this questioning of Schlesinger must
have represented an attempt to get on the record the explanation of what the
author believes to be a prime example of sleazy DoD legerdemain.
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Table 2-5 shows past and future military spending under both methods:
Table 2-5
Past and Projected Military Retirement Outlays
for Selected Fiscal Years: In Billions of Dollars

Current-Year Dollars
Constant 1978 Dollars

1964

1978

1979

1983

1985

2000

1. 2

9.1
9.1

9.9
9.4

13.8
10.4

15.6
10.7

12.4

2.4

37.5

Source: U. S. Congress. Congressional
Budget Office. The Military Retirement
System: Option for Change. U. S. Government Printing Office. 1978. Table 1. p. 7.
It should be remembered, however, that the U. S. military retirement system is
an unfunded, pay-as-you-go system.

The outlays which have been discussed

herein reflect only the,actual funds disbursed to retirees.

However, they give

no indication of the liability that the government is incurring for the future
costs of today's active duty personnel.

Sound pension planning in the private

sector mandates the recognition of such a liability in the form of an accrual
cost which must be ascertained and paid each year into a trust fund.
Estimates on such an accrual cost for the military vary.
Budget Office estimates are $7 .1 billion for fiscal year 1979. 11

Congressional

A strong case can

be made for the implementation of the accrual charge since in so doing the defense
budget will more accurately reflect its true cost.

Under the present accounting

system the defense function states the retirement costs of former military
employees who do not contribute to today's defense, but it includes no charges
for current military employees who are on active duty.

11

The figures of $7.1 billion plus the outlay currently incurred of $9.1
billion do not tell the story of the complexity of any of the approved methods
of pension plan funding. A reasonably basic explanation exists for the more
serious reader in Congressional Budget Office: Retirement Account Changes:
Budget and Policy Impacts. U. S. Government Printing Office. 1977. pp. 1-17.
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Above all, however, accounting changes of this type would increase
incentives to economize on manpower.

Retirement costs are a very important

part of the total cost of compensation, representing 30% to 45% of military
basic pay.

But if these costs do not appear in the budget it is less likely

that the true impact can be realized.
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CHAPTER III
Design Problems and Consequences

The chief single obstacle to any hope of successful
pension reform is the present provision which allows a high
percentage of pay to be immediately distributed upon completion of twenty years of service. No private plan has met
anything but waste and disaster with such a plan provision.
Its need here is bottomed upon the youth and vigor concept -and promotion flow.
Let us rid ourselves of the illusion that a young
and vigorous Army must be comprised of men in their late
teens and early twenties. Most Americans would be shocked
to know that the average age of the service arms is twenty
four . . . On balance, except for a few MOS classifications
in a very few parts of the world, I believe that the American
service man or woman can function satisfactorily into their
mid-fifties.
From testimony of Shelton Clarke,
witness, President's Commission on
Military Compensation, December 21,
1977, Washington, D. C.
Clearly the design feature of the immediate payout of an annuity
equal to 50% of basic military pay for a twenty-year career has been subjected
to as much or more criticism than any other by advocates of military pension
reform.

It has resulted, for instance, in an appalling exodus from the ser-

vices at an age far in advance of the end of usefulness to country -- indeed
as has been noted, the average age of 1975 enlisted personnel was 41 1/2 and
age 46 for officers.

This in turn triggers an annuity payout for a period of

time almost four times as long as is the case in the private sector where the
normal retirement age universally is 65.

1

lsee supra, Table 1-1. Contrasted with the $1 million plus projected payout illustrated would be a payout less than 1/10 as great for a comparably
salaried civilian plan participant in a 50% of pay defined benefit plan.
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Besides the monetary or budgetary aspects is the effect on the force
profile itself from the "twenty and out" feature.
phenomenon, which

re~lects

Largely because of this

the occurrence of both voluntary and involuntary

retirements at 20 years of service, DoD has found itself faced with excessive
manpower replacement costs encouraged if not directly caused by the retirement plan itself.

In terms of manpower management and the desired force

profile, DoD would like:
(a)

Increased retention at 4 to 12 years of service.

(b)

Increased retention at service after 20 years.

(c)

Reduced retention for 12 to 20 years of service. 2
Table 3-1
Retention of Officers and Enlisted Personnel
Numb~rs Remaining out of 1,000 Entrants

Years of
Completed
Service
0
5
10
15
20
25
30

Enlisted

Officers

1,000
194
121
97
89
11
3

1,000
411
329
327
318
134
46

Officers
and
Enlisted
1,000
211
137
115
107
21
6

Source: U. S. Congress. Congressional
Budget Office. The Costs of Defense
Manpower: Issues for 1977. Budget
Issue Paper. U. S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D. C. p. 77.

2

.
.
One question
wh.ich cries
out f or an
plan, non-vested for service less than 20
up to 45% of covered payroll, when at the
of 1,000 remain as employees. One answer
outrageous degree.

answer is how even an unfunded pension
years, can require a contribution of
end of 20 years only 107 employees out
is that "20 and out" is costly to an

26
Within the implications of the inverted pyramid shaped force shown
above, it may be easily seen that DoD has been unsuccessful in achieving its
force

management goals. 3

One reason could be that without universal mili-

tary training to assure it of an even inflow of personnel, it is forced to
operate in a market environment, encountering recruitment problems in inverse
relationship to the economic condition of the nation.4
plan upon several different assumptions of the economy.

Thus DoD must always
It must plan and

forecast upon data always reflecting (a) high civilian employment; (b) present
employment; and (c) lower employment.
The reader will note from Table 3-1 that almost 80% of enlisted
recruits leave the service by the fifth year.

Once an enlisted man has com-

pleted one term (usually 3 or 4 years) and reenlisted for another, the services

3While the author freely admits that reasonable men may differ on many
of the observations herein, there can be no difference of opinion in the
sentence referred to by ·the footnote. Recently Senator Sam Nunn, in his
Senate Subcommitte~ on Manpower and Personnel hearings of March 2, 1977 on
the All-Volunteer Armed Force attempted to elicit a consensus from four
experts on a possible return to the draft. On one point only were the witnesses in agreement, and it was that force management of the service arms
was poor.
4

The question of the advisability of a return to a fairly administered
and enforced system of universal military training as an obligation of citizenship is regretably outside the scope of this thesis. It is noteworthy
that in addition to all the communist bloc states, some 10 member states of
NATO use the draft, including the Federal Republic of Germany and France.
See especially the recent report to the Senate Armed Services Committee,
Achieving America's Goals: National Service or the All-Volunteer Armed Force?
95th Cong. 1st Sess. 121 pages. The report was prepared by William R. King,
Professor of Business Administration, Graduate School of Business, University
of Pittsburgh. Needless to say, Professor King, as does the author, believes
that the days of the volunteer army are numbered.
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are unwilling to force that person to leave until he has completed 20 years
and becomes eligible for a pension.

The President's Conunission noted this

"lock-in" as well:
. . Second, this "lock-in" constrains personnel
managers who may be reluctant to separate mandatorily any but
the very poorest performers and criminals. While specific
policies differ by service, it is likely that many marginal
personnel are carried to the 20-year point . . . Both in
absolute numbers and as a percentage, very few members with
more than 9 years of service are mandatorily separated. 5
Forcing a soldier out with less than 20 years, the services would
argue, is unfair.

At the other end of the spectrum, i.e., the first reenlist-

ment period, there is waste as well.

According to the Congressional Budget

Office, the Services hold down retirement costs consciously by limiting the
number of personnel peI'11!-itted to reenlist.

All of the services are turning

down some qualified persons who desire to reenlist after four years of service. 6
This policy sacrifices the multiple benefits of higher first-term reenlistments,
including a larger number of experienced journeymen personnel, reduced need for
recruits and lower training and recruiting costs.

This costly "tail wagging"

effect of plan-over-manpower is especially disturbing when studies have suggested that second-term military personnel may be 50% more productive than firstterm personnel.

7

5Report of the President's Cormnission on Military Compensation. op. cit.,
p. 43.

1977.

6congressional Budget Office.
op. cit., p. 80.
7

Ibid., N. 10, p. 24.

The Costs of Defense Manpower:
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Retirement benefits also have a strong effect upon retention later
in a career.

Few personnel leave after 10 to 12 years of service (see Table

3-1) when DoD desires an increase in service departure.

This is partly un-

avoidable and a similar trend at this point is found in private employment
but also because the "20 and out" point in time is anticipated. 8

Nor, as

it has been pointed out, do the services tend to force out personnel at this
point because of lost pension rights.

So here again the pension plan is

whiplashing DoD into undesired and costly manpower management practices.
Once the 20 year point is reached, a large fraction of the force
departs.

This is the "20 and out" device and the heart of plan abuse.

In

sum, the 20-year benefit and distribution provision under the current system
gives to the employer, who consists of the taxpayer base of the nation, the
worst of both worlds.

First, there is little retention incentive at the pre-

cise point at which DoD needs to improve retention (i.e., 4 to 12 years of
service and more than 20); and secondly, substantial retention incentive for
those whom DoD needs less (i.e., 12 to 20 years of service).
The President's Commission dealt harshly with the"20 and out" feature.
It did so by a reconnnendation which would delay the distribution of a life
annuity payout to a more realistic retirement age.

Under the Commission system,

old-age annuities would begin only at age 55 for 30 or more years of service;
at age 60 for 20 to 29 years of service; and at age 62 for 10 to 19 years of
service.

However at age 65, the recommended annuities in combination with

Social Security would still yield a very generous level of income.

For example,

the combination would replace more than 80% of after-tax active duty pay for a

8

Ibid., p. 81.
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30-year member and more than 65% of after-tax active duty pay for a 20-year
member.
The new pension alignment of military pay plus Social Security would
look as follows:
Table 3-2
Percentage of After-Tax Active Duty Income Replaced by
After-Tax Military Retired Pay and Social Security at age 65
Rank

Years of Service

Percent

E-6
0-4
E-7
0-5
E-7
0-5
E-8
0-6
E-8
0-6

16
16
20
20
22
22

79.5
63.0
78.5
65.8
77.5
68.6
78.0
73.4
85.6
81.7

25
25
30
30

Source: Report of the President's Commission on Military Compensation. Table
4-9. p. 80.
Richness Level of Benefit Formula
Coupled with the key defect of the distribution of an immediate annuity
at 20 years of service of 50% of basic pay is the question of what is an equitable benefit, both to the military retiree and to the non-military taxpayer
whose taxes fund the system. 9

In other words, what does the nation owe its

military for a reasonable career of faithful and dutiful service?

9 It is, of course, true that military personnel pay federal income taxes
under the same Internal Revenue Code as is applicable to civilians. However,
in 1976 some 89 million Americans paid taxes. Subtracting out the military
who comprise some 2 million and adjusting for level of income etc., the author
estimates that the civilian taxpayer bears over 98% of the cost of the military
retirement system.
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We must examine this eternally complex and classic question because
in general the United States' military retirement benefit is unique in the
world among governmental or private sector plans in the critical areas of
level-of-benefit to pay, and timing of distribution of benefit.

In the private

sector the norm is a pension of 40% to 60% of final average pay when the
applicable Social Security benefit is added.

Less than 3% of private plans

are inflation proofed for cost-of-living adjustments by a contractual tie to
the Consumer Price Index (CPI).

Congressman Les Aspin (D-Wis.) has suggested

that when the tax structure is fed into the equation one finds that a pension
equal to one-third of final pay will maintain the standard of living for a
taxpayer who had been paid $10,000 a year, which is the pay of an E-6 Staff
Sergeant or Chief Petty Officer (N).

10

A pension of 50% of pay will do the

same for a married taxpayer paid $20,000, which is the pay of an 0-4 Major
or Lt. Commander (N).
A further significant basis of comparison is the 1975 Bankers Trust
Company study.

The corporate pension clients analyzed therein comprise some

150 companies.

The 1975 work compares the various provisions of 271 plans of

which 75% are conventional and 25% are union.

11

The following table is drawn

lOAspin has made, and will continue to make in 1979, a very significant
contribution to the actual modification of military retirement as recommended
by the President's Commission. He introduced six bills in the 1976 Congress
to that end. Aspin has a doctorate in economics, has worked as an economics
analyst in the Defense Department and is a member of the House Armed Services
Committee. He has championed the enlisted man's pay rights on several recent
occasions.
11Bankers Trust Company, 1975 Study of Corporate Pension Plans, New York,
1975.
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from the statistical analysis showing median pension benefits as a percentage
of pay for four different compensation ranges with a separate calculation for
the Social Security benefit.

The career assumption is 30 years:
Table 3-3

Pension Benefits of Conventional Private Sector Plans
Median Plan Benefit
Final Year's
Compensation
$ 9,000
15,000
25,000
50,000

Note:

Final Pay
Plans

Career
Average
Plans

Total
Plans

Social
Security
Benefit

30%
33
36
38

28%
31
35
37

29%
32
35
38

39%
25
15
8

5% salary scale used in computations.
Source: Based on data from Bankers Trust
Company 1975 Study of Corporate Pension
Plans. New York. 1975.

The reader should note that the companies which are reflected in the
Bankers Trust data are among the nation's largest and most affluent, and possess
richer plans in level-of-benefits to pay than is the norm.

However, the data

does cover some 8.4 million of the total labor force of approximately 80 million
persons.
From Table 3-3 it may be seen that at the $15,000 civilian earnings
level (representative also of the average-in-force enlisted grade at the time
of retirement), the combined pension benefit plus Social Security is about 57%
of pay.

Note from Table 3-2 that the President's Commission recommended total

pension-to-pay percentage at the E-8 (the average enlisted grade at retirement)
is substantially higher; namely, 85.6%.
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However, almost none of the plans in the private sector are cost-ofliving indexed.

The Bankers survey in general shows that more than 80% of the

plans analyzed, exclusive of Social Security, yield a pension benefit of less
than 40% of final pay for a 30-year career.

Clearly the benefit level of the

American military retirement system produces a level of benefits far more than
the majority of non-military taxpayers can expect to receive.
It was in this general area of benefit comparability that the President's
Commission broke most completely with the defenders of the present system within
the military.

Citing the conditions of inequity as perhaps its chief finding-

albeit a philosophical one and expressed however implicityly in the report it
stated in chapter three, "Military Retirement: Deficiencies of the Current System":
The military retirement plan received more of the Commission's attention than any other component of military compensation . • . while:.the cost of military retirement represents a
substantial proportion of all defense expenditures, cost alone
does not provide a case for change. Rather, the Commission concludes that change is needed because of three inherent dificiencies
in the existing retirement plan.
1. The current system is inequitable. Compared to most
public and private sector systems, it provides significantly more
generous benefits • • • military retirement provides generous
benefits relative to private sector plans in a second respect:
military retirees' pay is completely protected against inflation,
an unusual and valuable feature.
The other two deficiencies referred to dealt with the lack of a vesting provision
for service of less than 20 years, and the inhibiting effect of the plan upon
force management.

It is important that the reader understand the importance

of the first deficiency especially, since it constitutes the very heart of the
Commission's findings. The consequence of any pension plan of an excessive
benefit level is excessive cost, and the only true method of reducing cost is
to first reduce benefits.
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Table 1-1 was prepared by the author for the CLU article mentioned
in the Preface.

It is repeated in this thesis to emphasize that it is in-

equitable for an Army Colonel or Navy Captain to receive $1,080,000 in
retirement benefits in 1977 dollars for an average retirement under reasonable
assumptions -- and that it is equally inequitable for a Sergeant First Class
or Navy Chief Petty Officer to receive $446,000 in similar circumstances.
Because of the admitted need for a vesting schedule which will
provide severance benefits for service less than 20 years, plus the need for
an accrual fund for in-service personnel -- any savings to be realized from
military pension reform will be disappointing.

But above all the reader must

realize that meaningful benefit reductions in the amount of total annuity
payout will be required to produce any savings at all.
Social Security Integration
Another major inequity which exists in military retirement is the
lack of the inclusion of. the ultimate Social Security benefit in the computation of the 50% or 75% retirement benefit.
lated a table to show the
author in Table 1-1. 12

'~alloon"

Martin Binkin of Brookings formu-

of benefits from this omission as did the

From the author's table it may be seen that the 0-6

Colonel or Navy Captain, at age 65, will have a combined military and Social
Security benefit equal to 193% of pay; in the case of the Sergeant First
Class or Navy Chief, 151%.
In the design and implementation of private pension planning, the
integration of the applicable· Social Security benefit under appropriate law
and regulations is almost universally followed.

12 . k"
.
Bin in, op. cit.,
p. 13 .

In the Bankers Trust survey

34
some 87% of conventional plans used some type of Social Security integration.
The Commission recommended the recognition of the benefit, as has every
observer of the system familiar to the author.
The CPI Cost-of-Living Adjustment
The final, substantive defect in the system which has significant
consequences in cost is the CPI cost-of-living adjustment used in military
retirement as well as in the civil service plans in which the civilian
employees of DoD participate.

Under a complex allocation formula, the

retirement benefits of these retirees are subject to cost-of-living adjustments (strangely the law does not provide for decreases) twice annually should
.
.
1y. 13
t h e CPI increase
su ff"icient

This affords them a complete shelter from

the loss of purchasing power during a post retirement period, in the case of
the 20-year military career, which often lasts 35 years or more.

The cost

consequence of this device is substantial and is the singlemost important
reason for the half trillion dollar payout mentioned in the motto of Chapter I.
A reasonable estimate may be made of the dollar value of the inflation-created
portion of the total payout projected from fiscal year 1975 to fiscal year
2000, the period of Senator Symington's estimate.

The President's Commission

estimated that without inflation military retirement pay would grow from $9.2 billior

1 3rhe reader may secure a clear and concise explanation of the mechanics
of the CPI adjustment, from the 1977 Uniformed Services Almanac, op. cit., pp.
43-44. It is here that public pressure upon the politician is in great need.
Besides being inequitable to the participants of the civilian non-governmental
labor force who have no comparable protection -- the immunity from inflation
worry removes from the bureaucrat the personal involvement that he above all
should have. It is imperative that the federal civil servant and the members
of Congress whose pension plans are inflation proofed, have the same self
interest in the fight against inflation as does the non-governmental taxpayer.
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in fiscal year 1978 to $13.2 billion in fiscal year 2000.

Using straight line

extrapolation from 1978 to 2000 beginning with $9.2 billion and ending with
$13.2 billion at year 2000, and adding in the cost for 1975 - 1977 of $27
billion, will yield a total non-inflated payout of approximately $292 billion.
Since the Symington estimate of payout with a 5% inflation factor was $470
billion, it may be seen that some $177.8 or $7.11 billion per year of the
twenty-five year average will be paid due to the cost-of-living CPI adjustment.
The reader should remain aware that similar projections and results may be
reached in a projection of the federal civil service plan. 14

In some way we

must demand no less than this of our politicians and civil servants in the
fight against inflation, which the author believes to be far more dangerous
than all the divisions and tanks and missiles of the Soviet Union combined.
The public servant must be made equally vulnerable to inflation if he is to
fear it equally with the citizenry.
It is important for the reader to understand in at least a general
way how and for whom the Index is compiled and how it operates in changing the

14
The above calls to mind an anecdote told by Hedrick Smith in his book,
The Russians. Smith, in conversation with a Russian scientist one evening
asked:
"What was the best period in Russian history? 'The best times of our lives, 1
he replied 'was the War.' 'Because at that time we all felt closer to our
government than at any other time in our lives. It was not their country then,
but our country. It was not their war, but~ war. It was our country we
were defending, our war effort. The war was the one time when the poets were
writing poetry sincerely.'" (Hedrick Smith, The Russians, The New York Times
Book Co. New York. 1976. pp.302-303.)
The anecdote is offered to suggest that while domestic inflation cannot be compared to the Wehrmach of Adolph Hitler, it is no less the enemy -- and an enemy
which the U. S. politician and civil servant should share with the people as is
now not the case.
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benefit level for several million Americans in an inequitable m.anner. 15
as to how the CPI is compiled.

First,

The Consumer Price Index (CPI) measures average

changes in prices of goods and services usually bought by urban wage earners
and clerical workers.

It is based on prices of about 400 items which are se-

lected to represent the movement of prices and goods and services purchased by
wage earners and clerical workers.

Prices for these items are obtained in urban

portions of 39 major statistical areas and 17 smaller cities which were chosen
to represent all urban places in the United States.

They are collected from

about 18,000 establishments -- grocery and department stores, hospitals, filling
stations, and other types of stores and service establishments.

Prices of food,

fuels, and a few other items are obtained every month in all 56 locations.
Prices of most other commodities and services are collected every month in the
five largest areas and eyery three months in other areas.
In calculating the Index, price changes for the various items in each
location are averaged together with weights which represent their importance in
the spending of all wage

~arners

and clerical workers.

combined to obtain a U. S. city average.

Local data are then

The Index measures price changes from

a designated reference date -- 1967 -- which equals 100.

An increase of 5% for

1968, for instance, would change the index to 105.
The reader will note that the Labor Department has not furnished to
the Congress a separate index reflecting the buying habits of at least a partial
sedentary life style which characterizes the retiree.

Thus, the CPI used for

the military as well as for the civil service pension plans will tend to over
15 The writer spent a good part of his testimony before the President's Commission attempting to show Commissioner John Filer that the principle of a percentage adjustment versus a flat dollar increase, resulted in excessive increases
for the high ranking military at the expense of the lower enlisted grades. This
line of reasoning will be fully developed herein.
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compensate for that reason.

Second, a good part of retirees live not in urban

areas but in a rural environment, whereas the Index is
urban centers.

compil~d

mainly from

This is a factor that will further tend to result in over

compensation.
However, the main deficiency -- a deficiency so blatant and obvious
that it cannot have been overlooked by the architects of the Index who are
themselves its beneficiaries
adjustments are awarded.

~

is the percentage principle upon which the

For example, the following table computes the effect

of a 7% CPI improvement upon the retirements of three different members of the
service. 16
Table 3-4
Effect of Annual CPI Cost-of-Living ImErovement of 7%
on Military Pension; 30-year Career

Rank or Grade
0-9 General or
Vice Admiral (N)
0-6 Colonel or Captain (N)
E-7 Sergeant First
Class or CPO (N)

CPI
Increase
@ 7%

Total
Benefit
2nd Yr.

CPI
Increase
@ 7%

Total
Benefit
3rd Yr.

$29,700

$2,079

$31, 779

$2,225

$34,004

22,632

1,584

24,216

1,695

27,606

9,828

687

10,515

736

11,251

Beginning
Annual
Pension

Source: Table 3-4 was constructed by the
author using current military pay rates.
It is basic to the principles of sound retirement planning that the
benefit to be received should not require an unreasonable drop in living standard on the part of the retiree.

In other words, the dollar value of the

benefit should comprise a reasonable percentage of earnings.
16

It is axiomatic

The use of a 7% improvement rate is entirely within reason. For the last
10 years the military have enjoyed an annual pension increase of more than 8%.

38

in the private sector, for example, for the corporate executive to receive a
higher benefit than a member of the rank and file.

And, of course, this

philosophy is translated into the military wherein the general receives a
higher benefit than does the colonel and the colonel more than the sergeant.
The author finds no fault with that, since pension follows pay.

However, and

most importantly, the principle of cost-of-living adjustments should be
expressed and allocated not on a percentage basis but on a flat dollar basis.
Note that the retired Lt. General and his wife presumably leading at least a
partial sedentary life with children grown and home paid for; with the drives
of economic acquisition presumably diminished -- receiving a first year allowance for a diminishment of purchasing power of $2,079 which is the pension
itself of many thousands of non-military retirees who have no such inflationary
protection. 17
Was this general's loss of purchasing power $2,079?
not; possibly $500.

Almost· assuredly

What is wrong is that he was given a percentage increase

whereas he should have had a flat dollar allowance for the actual dollar value
of loss of purchasing power.
Contrast the adjustment of the general with that of the sergeant and
his wife.

The author does not suggest that the sergeant should have the same

pension benefit -- certainly not.

But the actual loss in purchasing power

experienced by the sergeant was not dissimilar to that of the general by a
factor of three.

The taxpayer should not be compelled to bear the cost of

17
1ess than 1/2 of the labor force have private pension coverage at all.
Nor does the present CPI reflect the discounts which the military retiree is
privy to such as Commissary rights, post recreation privileges and free medical
care.
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such an absurd and wasteful level of over compensation to a favored few.
Indices based upon flat dollar cost-of-living adjustments could be constructed and maintained by the Department of Labor.
The attempt, however, to convince the President's Commission of
this inequity was in vain.

The following exchange was between the writer

and Commissioner John Filer, chief executive of the Aetna Life and Casualty
Insurance Company. 18
Mr. Filer. My assumption is your colonel and your sergeant, each
one's dollar was reduced by 7 percent of purchasing power, however,
Mr. Clarke. I am suggesting that maybe the percentage -- the percentage principle is wrong. The loaf of bread increased 10 cents
for both the colonel and the sergeant.
Mr. Filer. You can argue that in terms of base subsistence and the
ability to get along that one man's retirement is less than another.
But nevertheless it is a factor that each one's purchasing power was
reduced by the same percent.
Mr. Clarke. No. I was simply trying to say, Mr. Filer, that the
loaf of bread increased 10 cents for the colonel and the sergeant
alike, yet the colonel was compensated 4 times as much.
Mr. Filer.

Each was reduced by 7%.

Mr. Clarke. But it was reduced by a percentage and not a flat dollar level which is more equitable. The loaf of bread increased the
same for the colonel as the sergeant, so why should the compensation
for the loss of purchasing power be dissimilar?
Mr. Filer. Because his $8,000 of purchasing power was reduced by
7% and the other man's $3,000 was reduced by 7%, and the function
of a pension is not simply to continue to provide an absolute subsistence and no more. At least, I never thought it was.

18The writer has seen nothing in the several thousand pages of source
material studied for this thesis to suggest that the CPI should either be
uncoupled or modified. Dr. Gary Nelson did suggest by letter that the
Index is not geared to the expenses facing military retirees and indicated
that large cumulative cost differences over a period of time could result
therefrom. He stated that he believed the Department of Labor was working
on other types of cost-of-living indices at the present time.
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Mr. Clarke. You may be right as to the pension but not as to
the cost-of-living adjustment. What brought this to my attention Mr. Filer, was a letter to the editor in the New York Times
of September 18, 1976 in which a military retiree wrote a letter
which was highlighted. He said, "enough is enough". He said,
"although benefiting from it myself as a military retiree, I
have become convinced that it is essentially a giveaway program
which dispenses too much to those who don't need it and not
enough to those who do."
"In my own case I have been glad to get these raises but
enough is enough, and I don't think the generals really need
that giant increase while the sergeants have to scramble for
post-retirement jobs or go on relief."
And here is what he says that is important. He said that
as a guess a flat increase of about $20 per month would be
ample to off set the increased cost of living for that year.
A flat dollar benefit instead of a percent. Perhaps the letter
can be printed into the record.19
The reader has by now seen the scope and magnitude of a giant
governmental retirement system and the chief design defects which have
contributed to its excessive benefits and costs.

The chapters which follow

will describe the efforts which have been made to modify it, the military
response to those efforts and finally a suggested plan which is equitable
in benefits and reasonable in cost.

19

Needless to say the Commission did not recommend a change in the costof-living provision. The letter to the editor is appended so that the reader
may read the words of one American who would reduce his consumption at the
public trough.
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CHAPTER IV
Current Reform Alternatives

Old age annuities should begin at age 55 for 30 or
more years of service, at age 60 for 20 to 29 years of service,
at age 62 for 10 to 19 years of service. These annuities
should be similar to those provided civil servants, integrated
with Social Security benefits and protected from the effects
of inflation at age 65 the recommended annuities in combination
with Social Security replace more than 80 percent of after-tax
active duty pay for a 30-year member, and more than 65 percent
of after-tax active duty pay for a 20-year member.
From Introduction to Retirement
Recommendations. Report of the
President's Commission on Military
Compensation. Washington, D. C.
1978.
The complexity.and emotion surrounding change in the military retirement system point up the need to first establish criteria ·before attempting to
choose between the current system and a revised one.

The basic criterion is

that total military compensation, including retirement, should be only great
enough to attract and retain the personnel that the Department of Defense requires to carry out its mission.

This criterion, because it is designed to at

least match the sums other employers offer, takes account of the major aspects
that must be considered in setting pay scales.

The criterion requires that

pay be high enough to allow DoD to compete successfully in a market environment
for personnel, which is essential under conditions mandated by the all-volunteer
force.

On

the other hand, the criterion should insure that costs to the tax-

payer are kept to a minimum.
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Other criteria may also be useful in choice and design of the system.
For instance, military personnel must view the system as fair.

If not, they

may leave the military or, if they stay, they may perform less effectively. 1
It is a balanced reform, rational pension reform meeting those criteria, -that
must be found if the system is to be modified in an acceptable and stable manner.
Alternate Reform Measures
Serious efforts at military pension reform began in 1971 when an
Interagency Committee (IAC) was appointed by the President with particdpation
from the Office of Management and Budget, Department of Defense, Department of
HEW and Civil Service Commission) with a view toward reducing costs.
report was forwarded to the President in July 1971.

This

The recommendations of

the committee are shown in Table 4-2.
In 1972 the Secretary of Defense, following IAC action, established
a DoD Retirement Study Group to evaluate the IAC recommendations and to recommend changes to the military nondisability retirement system.

This inquiry

resulted in the Retirement Modernization Act (RMA) which was before the 94th
Congress as HR 7760.

This legislation would have made two major changes.

First, it provided for an early vesting of benefits.

Secondly, pensions were

to be reduced for 20-year careers.

lindeed the armed services of Great Britain are now said to be in a crisis
situation from low military pay and benefits. The British Army is one of the
worst paid in Europe, five of twelve NATO members pay privates more than
Britain pays lieutenants. Although having a first rate retirement plan, the
armed forces are experiencing extremely high rates of voluntary discharges.
It is, of course, well known in employee counselling that a competitive rate
of cash pay is an absolute requisite to sound employee relations notwithstanding the adequacy of a retirement program. (See Associated Press Release,
Richmond Times Dispatch. April 23, 1978.)

43
The third attempt came in the latter part of 1973 when the Defense
Manpower Commission (DMC) was established by Congressional directive to
conduct a broad and comprehensive study of overall DoD manpower requirements over the next ten years.

These findings, along with the Aspin proposals,

were reported to the President and the Congress in April of last year.

Signi-

ficantly it was here that the concept of a 30-point career was introduced
with a weighting of pension benefits for combat service.

The rationale here

is that the "youth and vigor" concept is important to the combat MOS and yet
early retirements in the non-combat specialities should be discouraged.
Additionally, the writer believes that this concept would assist the DoD and
the nation in solving the grave deficiency in our combat arms.

The actual

shortfall is classified and buried in the legerdemain and ambuguity of DoD
statisticians.

Howeveri many civilian strategists believe it to be critical.

The DMC proposals would grant a full annuity only after thirty years of
service.
Every four years the President by law must initiate a review of
military compensation.

The Third Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation

(QRMC) was formed in January 1975.

Areas of inquiry were military salary,

supplemental benefits and military retirement.
From a deep belief that the current military compensation system
is chaotic and essentially a system that promotes early retirements and
massive waste, Congressman Les Aspin introduced six bills in the 94th Congress
to revise the military retirement system.

His have become known as the Aspin

Proposals.

The heart of his reform goes to the elimination of the "quick

pension".

He would allow for voluntary retirements a full pension only at

age 55 with 30 years of service; at age 60 with 20 to 29 years of service;
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and at age 62 with 5 to 19 years of service.

For those officers and enlisted

men who are "forced out," he would provide an instant annuity under the
benefit formula assuming there are 5 years of service.
be reduced $1.00 for every $2.00 of earned income.
flat 2.5% of basic pay times years of service

This annuity would

Instead of the present

formula~

Aspin would substitute

a graduated benefit formula designed both to provide an equitable benefit for
a career of service and to assist DoD in its management of manpower and force
profile.

This formula would give 1.25% times a different pay (RMC, which is

the sum of basic pay, quarters and subsistence and the tax advantage) for
each of the first 5 years, 1.75% for each of the next 5 years, and 2% for
each year of service over 10.2
For a more equitable level of vesting, Aspin would make a participant
eligible for a benefit after 5 years of service.

Finally, Aspin would go to

the Canadian model for a phase-in member contribution, and a fund to be paid
by the services to assume actuarial solvency.
Table 4-1 notes the recommendations of the parties discussed above
by plan provision, and offers .to the reader a quick source of reference to a
fiercely complicated subject.

2

Guns and Butter, op. cit., pp. 23-26.

Table 4-1
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A Comparison of Proposed Changes in Military Retirement/Compensation

Plan
P,o\'islon

Current
System

Interai.:ency
Committee
(IACI
Proposal

Service Require,,,ents for a Pension
' Benefit

20YOS

20YOS

Retirement
Modernization
Act(RMAI
Proposal
20YOS

1

DMC
Study

JO. 20, or more
YOS with 30 re·
tirement pis.

QRMC
Services
Enlisted and officers RMC provi·
sions supported

1 pt. per YOS for
non-combat
I .S pts per YOS
for combat

Asp in
Proposals
Enlisted and offi·
cers after S YOS at
age 62; or at least
20 YOS, but less
than 30 YOS at age
60; or at least 30
YOS at age SS.
Recognize management need to force
indi,·iduals out of
service before a lull
career.

Vesting
Voluntary Separa1ion, enlisted

None

Enlisted and officers between 10-19
YOS, choice of:
Deferred annuity at
age 60 (2.5% x
YOSx BPJ
or

Enlisted and olfi·
between 10-20
YOS, pension at
age 60 based on
YOS x 2.S% of pay
(CPI adjusted)
CCI}

Lump sum: (S% x
YOS x BP) at
separation
Involuntary Sepa·
ration, enlisted

None

)fficcr:

Maximum Sl5,000
separation pay

lt!inition o! covred earnings

Terminal BP

lenefit Formula
•lultiplicrs

2.5%/yr. 20 and
o,·er YOS

(10th YOS) Enlisted and officers
-deferred annuity
at age 6S (High-3
average pay x per
pt. retirement
multiplierx YOS
completed).

RMA provisions
supported

Enlisted and officers-between S-20
YOS, pension at
age 62.

Note: Reduced de{erred annuity at
age 60.

Same

Enlisted and officers-between S-20
YOS two options, a
mo. benefit at age
60 plus immediate
cash payment, or a
cash payment
double that in first
option. Annuity at
60 computed on
standard formula
of 2.S% of pay x
YOS(CPI ad·
justed). Cash payment in first option
S"lo of pay x YOS,
and in second option IO"lo of pay x
YOS.

Enlisted and offi·
cers-readjustment
pay (mo. terminal
pay x 24 x per pt.
retirement multiplier) plus a de!erred annuity at
age 6S (reduced de·
!erred annuity at
60) or an additional
cash payment = to
amt. of readjusted
pay.

RMA

Enlisted and offi·
cers-immediate
retired pay with 5
or more YOS. Sec
employment re·
strict ion.

High-3 BP Average

High·l BP Average

Average o! High-3
years pay x no. o!
retirement pts.
(following shift to
salary system refigure "lo per retire·
mcnt pt.

High·l BP

'"Regular compensation" - based on
single-salary concept. The sum of
BP quarters allowances, subsistence
allowances and imputed tax advantage ordinarily
attributed to current quarters and
subsistence allowances.

2.5%/yr. 20-24
YOS; 3%/yr. 25-30
YOS; 2%/yr. 31-35
YOS

2.5%/yr 20-24
YOS 3%/yr 25-30
YOS

2.66%/
retirement pt.

RMA

1.5%/yr. to max.
of 5 YOS 1.75%/.
yr. from 5-10 YOS
2% /yr. over 11
YOS

Table 4-1 Continued
lntcrHi:en~y

Current
System

Plan
'ro,ision

Conimillce
(IAC)
Proposal

Retirement
!\loderniutlon
Act (RMA)
Proposal

DMC
Study

':mum Pension

7S% 30YOS

88% JS YOS

78% 30YOS

\1ions and
of payment

Full payment from
date of retirement

Full payment at S5
with 25 or more
YOS

Full payment with
30YOS

Full payment at
30YOS

Early retirement
transition provision. Reduced
annuity at retirement ::: to 2.S"lo/
YOS minus lS"lo.
Increased annuity
at 30 YOS anniversary = to 2.S"lo/
YOS

Early retirement
(less than 30 YOS).
Permanent actuarily reduced
annuity.

Early retirement:
20-24 YOS reduced
annuity from retirement to age 60 at
2%/yr. under 60.
25 or more YOS,
reduced annuity
from retirement to
S5 at 2%/yr. under
5S.

''.iovment
'.ri;tions
·ble Dipping
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QRMC
Sen ices
RMA

Not addressed

RMA

Age62S-19 YOS;
age 60 20-29 YOS;
age SS '30 or more
YOS for voluntary
retirements.

Dual Compensation Act (regular
officers only). Forfeit I/, mil. retirement pay if employed in ci,.il
service

Same

Same

Same

Monthly retired
pay of anyone involuntarily retired
with at least 5 YOS
and less than 62; at
least 20 YOS but
less than 30 YOS
and less than 60
yrs. o! age; at least
30 YOS but less
than SS yrs. of age.
Will be offset mo.
by any earned income rec'd == to 1/2
amt. of such earned
income. Earned income is defined in
the IRS code of
19S4.

Full SS retirement
benefits payable

At age 6S retired
pay reduced by
50% of SS retirement benefits
based on servicerelated earnings

A I age 65, retired
pay/annuity reduced by SO% of
that portion of SS
retirement benefits
based on servicerelated earnings.
(Transition provision). To prevent
deferred annuities
from being wiped
out by SS gains,
guarantee a minimum of SO"lo of de!erred annuity at
age 6S.

Full SS benefits
payable, but should
be considered when
determining multiplier

RMA

Full SS retirement
benefits payable at
this time. Additional consideration probable.

Noncontributory

Noncontributory

Noncontributory

Noncontributory

Noncontributory

Under consideration: a fund developed by contributions by the member(7% ofsalary)
matched by the
federal government.

Semi-annually
(March & Sept)
based on "lo of CPI
inc. in previous
6mos.

Not addressed

Same as current
system

Actual inc. in CPI

Not Addressed

Tied to COL benefit inc. made in SS
entitlements.

~I

bi Security

'

..

rucipation

1

LAdjustments
IIndexed

L

A•pln
Proposal•

Source: Excerpted and modified by the writer from a comparison prepared by Ad Hoc Comminee of the United States Flt!<'t Reserve Association.
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Table 4-2
Summary of Effects of Changes
Current System

RMA Proposal

Key Changes & Effects:
Annuity for 20-Year Retiree (a)
Benefits for 0-19 Years' Service?
Member Contribution Required?
Phase-in for Reduced Annuity
Lifetime Retirement Pay (b)
30-Year Retiree
20-Year Retiree
10-Year Retiree

50% of basic pay
No
No
$310,000
190,000
0

Reduced 30% below current level for 10 yrs.
Then restored
Yes
No
20 Years
$295,000
155,000
15,000

Summary of Effects:
Overall Evaluation

Effect on Career Patterns

Required Changes in Personnel
Management .Policies
Costs (constant dollars)
FY 2000
Total FY 1979-2000
Costs in DoD Budget if
Accounting Procedure Change

Features large losses
after 20 years of service, but few losses
from 10 - 19 years.
Costs increasing
through end of this
century.
See above

None

Retains career pattern
similar to today's, but
costs less. Low risk.
Proposed by DoD.

Continued high losses
after 20 years likely.
Retention may be higher
from 5 - 9 years and
lower from 10 - 19
years.
Few required

$46. 8 billion
$936 billion

Saves $1.2 billion
Saves $11 billion

$7 .1 billion

Saves $1.6 billion

(a)

Percentage reductions ignore high-1 or high-3 averaging, which depends on
inflation assumptions.

(b)

Total retirement pay for typical enlisted man expressed in today's dollars
but undiscounted. Assumes retirement at median paygrade for given year of
service, and average mortality rates.

48

Table 4-2 Continued

IAC Proposal

Reduced 34-42% below current
level to age 60. Then
restored (c)
Yes
No

Annuity at
·Age 55 to 62
Option

Annuity begins at
age 60.

President's Commission
on
Military Compensation

Annuity begins at age 60.

Yes

Yes

No

No

10 Years

10 Years

4 Years

$265,000
110,000
15,000

$210,000
65,000
10,000

$281,109
191, 971
8,600

Middle-ground option.
More savings and
longer careers than
reduced-to-30 option.
But no fundamental
change.
Similar to reduced-to30 except probably
increase in those staying
past 20.

Some to accommodate
longer careers, but
no fundamental changes.
Saves $2.2 billion
Saves $19 billion
Saves $2.4 billion

Far-reaching change.
Significantly longer
careers. Many personnel management
changes. High risk.
High potential
savings.
Strong incentive to
stay 30 years or
more. Retention may
be lower from 5 - 19
years of service,
though results
uncertain.
Fundamental changes
in all phases of
personnel management.
Saves $2.8 to $4.5
billion
Saves $26 to $36
billion
Saves $3.8 billion

Significant change. Much
longer careers. Moderate
risk. Disappointing
savings.

Possible incentive to stay
past 20 years. Large
deferred compensation fund
might encourage severance
from service to get large
sums of money.
Some for longer careers.

Saves nothing until FY 1998
Added costs over current
system approximately $1 billion

N/A

(c) Range depends on whether retiree is an officer (low end of range) or enlisted
(high end).
Source: The basic table is reproduced from
CBO, The Military Retirement System: Options
for Change, Table 9, pp. 68-69. The author
has added the analysis for the President's
Commission heading and modified several column
headings. Other modifications were made where
indicated. The reader may by reference to
Tables 4-1 & 4-2 quickly summarize the bulk of
all pertinent potential reform measures.
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Because substantial reform will almost certainly, in the absence
of a national or international crisis, occupy the attention of Congress
during the first half of 1979, the serious reader may appreciate an attempt
to be provided with a narative, descriptive summary of the philosophy and
effect of the several major reform efforts marshalled in part by Table 4-1. 3
The recommendations of the Carter Commission, which consisted of ideas both
old and new, will be summarized in the concluding portion of this chapter.
In light of the substantial amount of time and effort which has
been allocated and is being spent on military pension reform, it is possible
that most of the components of the new system can be now identified.4

For

instance, all of the studies, as well as DoD itself, have recommended changes
in the military retirement system.
of change.

They do not, however, agree on the amount

The studies:illustrated in Table 4-1, as well as that of the

Commission, illustrate a range of change from modest to severe.

All of the

studies have recognized a need for some degree of benefits for ,those who
retire with less than 20 years of service.

The packages differ in the benefit

multiplier itself and the amount and length of reduction in annuity for service
of between 20 and 30 years.

The studies are roughly divided as to whether or

not the military benefit should be reduced by all or a part of the Social
Security benefit.

3Shortly after the Report of the Commission was delivered to the Chief
Executive he stated that he would make his recommendations known to the
Congress in January of next year. The process, certain to result in an overall
realignment of benefits downward to some degree, will be both emotional and
explosive.
4

one item of reform, almost certainly is the elimination of the quick,
20-year pension of 50% of pay. Besides being exhorbitant in cost, it robs
the force manager of a valuable tool in shaping the profile of the service
arms, a principle fully explained in Chapter III. A second quess would be
that the Social Security will be integrated into the military benefit in the
same manner that it is used in the vast majority of private sector plans.
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A.

The Retirement Modernization Act (RMA) Proposal

This package was introduced in the Congress in 1974, 1975 and 1976.
Legislative action was never completed.

This option would reduce costs, but

it should result in modest changes in career patterns.

It is this option

which would be most favored by those who believe that the military can best
accomplish its mission with career patterns similar to those currently in
force.

Hence, for service of less than 30 years, this package would reduce

annuities by creating a "two-step" annuity.

The first step would last until

the person would have completed 30 years of service, which is a full career.
During the first step the annuity would be

reduce~by

about 30 percent.

Dur-

ing the second step, the annuity would be restored to close to its level
under the current system. 5
This option would also provide def erred benefits for less than 20
years of service.

A person leaving after 10 years of service would receive

an annuity of 25% of basic pay, but payable at age 60.
remain noncontributory.

The system would

In addition, this package would base annuities on

average pay during the one year of highest pay, would increase the credit for
retirement for service over 24 years, and would require an offset of the onehalf of Social Security payments attributable to military service.
Under the current system for a typical enlisted man retiring at 39
after 20 years of service, an immediate lifetime annuity of $5,800 is granted.
Under similar facts the RMA annuity during the first-step would be $4,010 for
10 years, then $5,370 -- then at 65 the military annuity would drop to $4 1 300
reflecting the Social Security benefit.

SU. S. Congress. Congressional Budget Office. The Military Retirement
System: Options for Change. Budget Issue Paper to Fiscal Year 1979. U. S.
Government Printing Office. 1978. P• 42.
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Finally, it is suggested that under the RMA proposal there would
be an added incentive to complete a longer service career.

On balance,

however, this option would have relatively modest effects on career patterns.6
RMA Effect on Costs
Under the CBO classification of what is termed base-case behavior
the RMA option would eventually reduce manpower costs. 7

By the year 2000,

outlays would go down by $1.2 billion a year in 1978 dollars and savings
would continue to grow significantly in the years beyond 2000.

The total

savings between implementation in 1979 and the year 2000 would equal $11
billion.

Most of the savings would occur because of reductions in annuities

for those retiring with less than 30 years of service.
Summary of RMA Option
This option will save money.

The RMA option would probably lead
~

to modest changes in the pattern and length of military careers.

Among the

options under consideration in this chapter, this option would be the least
consistent with the idea that military careers should be lengthened.

It was

originally drafted by DoD and championed in the Congress by the hawks of
Vietnam.

It has been overtaken by time and the economic forces of inflation.

6 Ibid., p. 43.
7
Base-case turnover assumes that there is no change from voluntary career
retention that cannot be offset by involuntary severence from the service.
Under base-case, the only deviation from current behavior is an increase in
the number of involuntary separations between 10 and 19 years of service in
the enlisted grades.
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B.

The Interagency Committee (IAC) Proposal

This option was designed by an interagency committee in 1971.
Department of Defense was well represented on the committee. 8

The

The package

is a middle ground option in fiscal savings and on career patterns.

It

would call for changes in the force profile.
Like the RMA option preceding, this one would create a two-step
annuity except that here the reduction in the first step would be larger
and last longer.

The reductions here would range from 34 to 42 percent below

current levels versus about 30% under RMA. 9

The reductions under this option

are designed to reduce military retirement pay during years when the retiree
is presumed to hold a civilian job.lo

Changes would be phased in over 10

years, and would provide benefits to separations from service with under 20
years.
Contrasted with the current system which in the case of a typical
enlisted man retiring at 39 with 20 years of service would receive an immediate lifetime annuity of $5,800; this option would yield him $3,110 to
age 60, then $5,360 til 65 at which point the military annuity would fall
to $4,000 being partially offset by the applicable Social Security benefit.

8Edward T. Braswell, permanent counsel to the Senate Armed Service
Conunittee sent the author a copy of the original report in 1974. The
heavy hand of the career military bias was in every chapter and on every
page. It was later modified.
9 cBO, The Military Retirement System: Options for Change, op. cit.,
p. 52.

lOThe percentage of military retirees who seek and hold second career
employment is very high, approaching 85%.

53
IAC Effect on Costs
Given again base-case career behavior, the initial savings here
would be similar to RMA, but eventual savings would be larger.

By the

year 2000, costs under this option would diminish by $2.2 billion a year
in 1978 dollars.

Total savings between 1979 and 2000 would equal approximately

19 billion dollars.

Outlays would, as they will in all the proposals, increase

in the first few years.
Summary of IAC Proposal
This·option is estimated to save about $19 billion between now and
year 2000.

However, the IAC package seems unlikely to result in a drastic

change in current career patterns, which feature large numbers of retirements
after 20 years of service.
enlisted retirees.

The option would reduce annuities for 20-year

There would also be substantial reductions for officers

although the IAC plan would permit annuities to continue to grow for those
who stay past 30 years reaching a maximum of 88% of pay for 35 years of
service.
On balance, IAC's larger and longer annuity reduction for 20-year
careerists combined with higher annuities for those who stay past 30 years
should reduce the number of 20-year terms and increase the numbers of those
serving beyond 20 years.

It is this option which may approach the largest

cost savings possible without significant changes in career patterns and
force profile management.

c.

The Annuity at Age 55 to 62 Package

This package, which comes most closely to satisfying the desires
of those who believe that immediate and meaningful pension reform is needed,
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is a hybrid mix containing elements of the DMC Study and Aspin Proposals
found in Table 4-1, and strong overtones of certain portions of the recommendations of the 1977 President's Commission.

Its characteristics and

effects are noted in Table 4-2 and comprise the third option for. that table.
This option is far-reaching and would result in significantly longer military careers.

11

The eligibility rules for age follow those currently in

effect for the federal civil service.

The completion of 5 to 19 years of

service begets an annuity beginning at 62; while those completing 20 to 29
years of

servi~e

receive an annuity at 60.

Those completing 30 years or

more will receive an annuity at age 55.
While similar to the federal civil service for eligibility (see
above) the plan differs from it in two ways.

It would be non-contributory,

and it would provide a cash bonus equal to one year's pay for involuntary
severance at 20 to 30 years of service.

This bonus, as well as the combat

credit in the DMC option, would be designed to provide the Department of
Defense with the flexibility to attract and retain those personnel, particularly enlisted combat personnel, who must be separated with less than 30 years
of service for purposes of youth and vigor.
The annuity-at-SS proposal would radically change the pattern of
annuity payout.

Rough calculations indicate that for a typical enlisted man

retiring after 20 years of service, lifetime retirement earnings would equal
$65,000 as compared with $190,00 under the current system, a cut of 66%.

For

a typical enlisted retiree with 30 years of service, lifetime retirement earnings would go down some 32%.

llThis is a most important point. The average American would be shocked
to know that the average age of the entire U. S. Armed Forces is about 24.
This option, as did the recommendations of the President's Commission, employed
provisions which if implemented, will mandate substantially longer military
careers.
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Force Management Under the Annuity at Age 55 to 62 Option
The pattern of incentives offered by retirement would be substantially
different from those in the previous option packages.

An entirely different

career pattern might evolve, reflecting the provision of some benefits after
only five years.
reduced.

The pull to stay for twenty years might be significantly

Whereas the previous retirement options feature a drop in value of

retirement after 20 years of service, this option would not.

The value of

retirement benefits would continue to grow, in fact would grow most quickly
as the 30-year service mark was approached. 12· Losses after 20 years of service should be much lower, with the typical career lasting for 30 to 35 years.
Losses from 10 to 20 years of service should occur more evenly (see
Chapter I I I for discussion of desired force profile of the service arms).
Losses from 5 to 9

year~

of service would be uncertain though they could be

substantially higher.
Effect on Costs Under the Annuity at 55 to 62 Option
This option, of course, would result in substantial savings.

By the

year 2000 costs would be reduced by $4.5 billion a year and savings would continue to grow afterwards as well.

Cumulative savings between 1979 and 2000

would total more than $36 billion in 1978 dollars.

Costs would increase for

several years as they would under all the optional packages.

It is likely that

the more senior force resulting from the implementation of this option would be

12The serious reader should study the philosophy behind such formulation.
Pension practioners in the private sector have always counted this type of
design as desirable and basic and have been puzzled at the inability of DoD
and Congress to realize that a badly designed pension plan can corrupt desirable employee pattern objectives.

56
more productive, resultin& in the author's judgment, in substantial additional
savings.

However, of all the options hitherto discussed, this one would

present the greatest potential risk to the force manager

and to the nation.

It cannot"be ruled out that this option might not allow DoD to attract and
retain adequate numbers of personnel.
It would appear that the Carter Commission weighed heavily the pros
and cons of this option.

The reader will note that when the Commission did

render its report a new, radical device had been added, namely a deferred
compensation trust fund to "assist former service members in their transition
to civilian life and to provide additional incentives to remain on active duty
through arduous and difficult duties. 1113

On balance, however, it is highly

likely that the reformed system will have heavy overtones of the Annuity at
55 to 62 Option.

Furth~r,

this option, as well as the proposed plan of the

President's Commission, is perfectly compatible with the Aspin Proposals
which are not included in Table 4-2 but are described in Table 4-1.
D.

The President's Commission Option

Of all the options discussed, this, the latest, will perhaps most
influence the draftsmen of the ultimate, revised system.

On June 27, 1977,

President Carter established the Commission and charged it directly to:

13The Connnission may have seriously erred in creating an additional fund
of such magnitude. It would yield an additional $122,850 at 1% interest, for
a 25-year career to a typical officer entering the service after 1978. It
would yield in similar circumstances some $57,610 to the typical enlisted
person. This fund, however, may not be dismissed out of hand. Some provision
may have to be made for personnel between the time of retirement and the
commencement of the annuity payments -- for reasons of equity.
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review at least the analyses, findings and recommendations related to military compensation which have been completed by the
Quadrennial Reviews of Military Compensation, the Controller
General, the Interagency Committee Study of Uniformed Service
Retirement and Survivor Benefits, the Department of Defense
Retirement Study Group, and the Defense Manpower Commission.
Carter directed that the Commission identify, study and make recommendations
on critical military compensation issues, specifically addressing the following issues:
• . • What are the purposes of the military retirement system?
Is the present system effective in achieving these purposes?
What changes are appropriate?
The Commission was composed of eight Commissioners and a chairman,
Charles J. Zwick, who was a former Rand analyst, a former Director of the
Budget, and now President of the Southeast Banking Corporation of Miami,
Florida. 14

The Commission was staffed heavily with in-service personnel

and former members of the military who have been employed by the government
in various civilian capacities thus giving rise to the possibility that the
Commission members, all

~usy

men and women, would be staff directed and

staff run. 15

14 The Commissioners were Benjamin 0. Davis, Jr., Lieutenant General,
U. S. Air Force (Ret); William E. DePuy, General, U. S. Army (Ret); Thomas
Enrlich, Presiden4 Legal Services Corporation; John F. Filer, Chairman of
the Board, Aetna Life and Casualty; Phillip A. Odeen, Vice President, Wilson
Sporting Goods; Walter H. Page, Chairman of the Board, J.P. Morgan & Co.;
Jane c. Pfeiffer, Management Consultant; and Herbert F. York, Director,
Program in Science, Technology, and Public Affairs, University of California,
San Diego.

15 rndeed, this extremely heavy military influence caused observers to
predict that little meaningful would come from its efforts in the way of
military pension reform. The author believes that these fears were essentially
incorrect.
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President's Commission Retirement Recommendations and Their Significance
As the epigraph of this chapter would suggest, the "20 and out",

quick pension would be eliminated and the present benefit formula multiplier
of a straight 2.5% of salary would fall to those of the federal civil service,
namely:
Years of Service

Per Year Multiplier

1

to 5

2.00

6

to 10

2.25

11 to 35

2.75

These multipliers are designed as they should be, to encourage service over
a longer career.

If the Commission had stopped at that point the military

would have a plan roughly comparable to that of their civilian counterparts
one of the finest in

th~

nation, but without the burden of the 7% of pay annual

personal contribution now borne by the civil servant.
In addition, the Commission option called for a continuation of
inflation protection and· a partial Social Security offset. 16

No longer would

military old-age annuities be paid to former military members while they were
in the federal Civil Service; and a grandfather cloak would be thrown over the
shoulders of the present force -- exempting from the retirement rules of the
Commission those with 4 or more years of service, serving their second enlistment, or serving beyond their initial period of obligated service at the date
of enactment.

16 The military pension reduction at age 65 would vary from 17% with 20
years of service to 11% with 30 years of service at rank of 0-5 and 0-6 to
prevent a full superimposition of the Social Security benefit.
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The President's Commission Deferred Compensation Trust Fund
The Commission would create a deferred compensation trust fund for
each member who completes five years of service.

The government's contribu-

tion to the fund for each member would be a decreasing percentage of basic
pay each year, starting with 20% for years 6 to 10, and dropping to 5% for
years 26 to 30.

Members with 10 or more years of service could withdraw a

portion of this account while on active duty.
This trust fund philosophically would serve at least two functions.
First, it would assist fromer service members in their transition to civilian
life and secondly, it would provide funds through periodic withdrawal to fund
the "blackout period" from the day of discharge to the commencement of the old
age annuity.17
The amounts to be provided as envisaged by the Commission are substantial and may be seen below:
Table 4-3
Amount of Deferred Compensation Accrued for an
Individual Who Enters Active Duty in 1978*
Years of Service

Officers

Enlisted Persons

10
15
20
25

$ 18,320
48,550
88,960
122,850
140,890

$ 8,610

30

23,230
42,400
57,610
66,210

*Figures shown are fiscal year 1978 dollars for an individual who
enters 1 January 1978 and leaves in the future with the stated years
of service. Calculations are based on assumed 1.5% real wage growth
and a 1.0% real interest rate on the fund.
Source: Report of the President's Commission.
Table 4-7, p. 69.
17However, the Commission did offer data which indicate that between 73% and
89% of all retirees seek and take a second career and that the average officer is
successful within 3 to 6 months, while the enlisted person requires 2 to 12 months.
There is a comparative earnings loss in the subsequent career of between 1% to 24%
for enlisted retirees, and 6% to 38% for officer retirees as against comparably
aged and educated civilians.
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In addition to the deferred compensation fund, the current severance
pay provision, presently limited to officers terminating at 5 - 15 years, would
be broadened and enlarged to include enlisted personnel:
Table 4-4
Comparison of Severance Pay: Commission Plan Vs. Current System
Years of
Service at
Separation
5
10
15
20
25
30

Officers
Current
Commission
System
System
$12,804
15,000
15,000

$ 1,431
3,475
8,493
15,325
24,621
32,050(b)

NA
NA
NA

Enlisted Persons
Commission
Current
System(a)
System
0
0
0

NA
NA
NA

$

721
1,643
4,057
7,157
11,598
15,473(b)

(a)

Enlisted reservists with 5 or more years of active duty are
entitled to severance pay.

(b)

Maximum of 1 year's basic pay.
Source: Report of the President's
Commission. Table 4-8. p. 71.
The net effect of the recommendations of the Commission on military

retirement is extremely difficult to assess.

Without doubt, however, the total

pension payout for the 20 and 25-year service career has been reduced vis a vis
that of the current system.

18

A sharply worded and lengthy dissenting view inserted in the record
by Lt. Gen. Davis bespeaks of the Report as a proposal that "would cut military careerists' lifetime compensation in half", a view that the author holds
to be gross exaggeration.

The Commission Report contains copious tables and

18The 20-year career is approximately the average career for enlisted
personnel while the 25-year career is slightly greater than the average for
the officer corps.
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illustrations which compare total payout for various grades and ranks for
different length service careers which make Gen. Davis's charge untenable.
But there is a diminishment of comparative payout for any length career
less than 30 to 35 years.
Perhaps the key chart, which more than any other contained in the
report would aid the reader in a comparison of total payout, is a presentvalue analysis which compares benefits at various years of service.

In

this table the reader will note that the current internal inequity borne
by short service (less than 20 years) enlisted careers has been replaced
by incentives to stay on until a full length career has been attained.
It was this writer's testimony at the hearings that it is rank
foolishness to attempt to design a retirement plan which would be meaningful
to a 18-year old enlisted person.

This was done after prior witnesses had

suggested that even at that age the current retirement plan constituted a
powerful recruitment tool.

Fortunately, the Commission accepted a similar

view and the proposed plan should have little effect on recruiting or retention during the initial enlistment period.

Table 4-5
Present Value at Termination: Current System and
Combined Old-Age Retirement and Deferred Compensation
Value

Officer
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($000)
480
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.··~

Compensation

=-~·····

o-1-----~------.------+------.---~--.--------.

5

I0

I5

20

25

30

35

Years of Service at Termination
Assumes discount rate equals inflation rate; this is,
real discount rate equals 0%
Source: Report of the President's Corrnnission
on Military Compensation. Figure 4-9, p. 82.
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Overall, the pattern of force management and retention rates of
the Commission proposals should follow that of the previously discussed
Annuity at 55 to 62 Option as well as that of the Aspin Proposals.

Tiie

distinguishing feature of the Commission plan is the extremely substantialin-amount deferred compensation fund provided to compensate for the military
"X" factor.
Cost Effect of the President's Commission Option
It is in the extremely disappointing monetary area that the Commission
option might be most vulnerable, for although it purports to cut total pension
payout substantially it offers little savings over the current plan until the
turn of the century.

Tiie reasons are both obvious and hidden.

The Commission plan, as do all the option packages, calls for the
earning of meaningful benefits during the first 20 years.

Tiiis in itself is

a quite consequential and substantive expense and is probably the singlemost
19
.
.
prominent
reason t h at monetary savings
are mo d est an d d"istant.

However, it

is entirely possible that the administration will request that the military
retirement plan be put on a funded basis as are the plans of the private sector.

19 nata indicate that projecting costs as they are now carried, i.e., on
a pay-as-you-go basis unfunded, the proposed President's Commission plan would
add $60 million in cost in 1983, increasing to $700 billion extra by 1989
which is the high-water year -- then producing a net savings in 1998 of $300
million going to an annual net savings of $4.4 billion in the year 2019.
20 see Congressional Budget Office. Retirement Accounting Changes. op. cit.
Since the first year accrual change would add $7 billion to the budget, the
political feasibility of such a move is not unimportant.

20

64
Here there is a charge for retiree's annuities but in addition there is an
interest bearing fund to which payments must be made annually which, on an
actuarial basis of soundness, must be capable of reasonably amortizing the
costs of the in-service force.

At the present time this unfunded liability

stands at $268 billion.
Should the nation transition to a funded plan, however, the
President's Commission proposals would become more fiscally attractive,
relative to the accrual amount which would have to be added under the current
plan.

In such circumstances the President's Commission Plan would require

a contribution of approximately 28.5% of basic pay for each member of the
system while the current system would require 36.7%.
The reader will note that the path leading to a revised military
pension system has been long and varied.
seven years ago.

Serious efforts were begun almost

There is, however, a direct precedent for such a time

span in the legislative history of private pension reform.

Efforts to

effect reform among those plans were begun in 1962 with the creation of a
blue ribbon commission by President Kennedy and final action was not taken
until Labor Day of 1974 when Gerald Ford signed into the law the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act.

In the next chapter many of the factors

which have contributed to the delay in military pension reform will be discussed and developed.
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CHAPTER V
Military Response to Reform Proposals

The Air Force and other military services are unique
callings. The demands we place on our military men and women
are unlike those of any other country. Our worldwide interests
and commitments place heavy burdens and responsibilities on
their shoulders. They must be prepared to live anywhere, fight
anywhere and maintain high morale and combat efficiency under
frequently adverse and uncomfortable conditions. They are
asked to undergo frequent exposure to risk, long hours, periodic
relocation and family separation. They accept abridgement of
freedom of speech, political and organizational activity, and
control over living and working conditions. These are all part
of the very personal price our military people pay.
Statement of John Stetson, Secretary
of the Air Force before the President's
Commission on Military Compensation.
Washington, D. C. January 19, 1978.
It is doubtful that a more eloquent description of the military
"X" factor has ever been delivered than the one which is reproduced above,
and iL is mainly this "X" factor upon which the members of our armed forces
-rely as the principle rationale for a continuation of the status quo in the
issue of pension reform.

The "X" factor, as applied to the military and as

it is perceived by service personnel and members of their families, is that
particular inconvenience and added degree of personal sacrifice and physical
risk which is experienced and which sets them apart from the general population.
It varies greatly both among the services as well as the MOS classifications
among the personnel.
For the vast majority of the men and women of today's service arms
this factor does not contain meaningful added physical risk or danger since
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the overwhelming percentage of today's forces are non-combatant. 1
support ratios

Combat-to-

for the active Army stood at approximately 25% of total

strength in 1971.
In 1975 the Army, in an effort to reverse this trend, reclassified
manpower from support-and-headquarters to combat classification.

Units from

the National Guard and Reserves have been factored into the active force to
where at the present time if the nation became engaged in a major conflict,
58% of its field artillery will come from these reserve components.

Likewise

65% of the Army's combat engineer battalions, 52% of its infantry and armor
battalions and 45% of its aviation forces as well as 65% of all Army tactical
support would be from the irregular forces.

It is estimated that of the

220,000 Army ground personnel now assigned to NATO and stationed in Europe,
less than 64,000 are corllbat troops. 2
These statistics are not intended to demean those men and women in
our armed forces to whom patriotism has some degree of meaning.

The VA hospitals

and the military graves of the nation bear heartbreaking testimony to the fact
that honor, duty and country.does exist in the service arms.

But the American

military press and the servicemen's lobby groups which strive so mightily for
1 Perhaps in no other war in our history was the "X" factor among the soldier
and sailor more unevenly distributed than in Vietnam. The author will never forget an attempt to console two friends, parents of a slain Navy medic in 1970.
"It was so unfair," said the mother bitterly. "Our son joined the Navy. He
wasn't supposed to be in danger but when he got to Vietnam, he was attached to
the Marines". Of the 525,000 troops in-country at the height of the war -- less
than 25,000 were in the field in a combat capacity. For the vast number of the
American forces, their tour in Vietnam was less dangerous than the crossing of a
busy New York City street.
2narold J. Logan, "Guard, Reserve at a Curious Crossroads." The Washington
Post. June 27, 1977. p. A-2.
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the destruction of any attempt at pension reform should not be permitted to
have it both ways.

They may not, for example, plead

the case for the con-

tinuation of a lavish pension plan on the grounds that to be in the military
is to be in jeopardy of life and limb when there is ample data to show that
in our wars, the one-tour citizen soldier has always borne the brunt of battle
mortality.

However, because the "X" factor syndrome is the rationale most

ardently advanced and defended, it is necessary to thoroughly analyze and
develop its composition and applicability.
The following examples should be of value to the reader.

At the

close of World War II and the subsequent demobilization of the armed forces
of the Unites States there grew, in the context of the cold war which followed,
a fear that we had dissolved at too rapid a rate our forces in being relative
to those of the Soviet Union.

Out of this fear there was fashioned an incredibly

disciplined deterrence system -- indeed for 15 years our only credible deterent
was the Strategic Air Command.

From the level of discipline and selfless dedi-

cation imposed upon and accepted by both the air crews, who suffered appalling
divorce rates, and the ground crews, who displayed no less a degree of fanaticism,
a fearsome "X" factor evolved and was sustained without the justification of war
as a causation factor. 3
Consider, on the other hand, the example of an Air Force major engaged
in computer technology.

Having entered the service in 1950 and serving a 25-year

career during which he rose from the rank of lieutenant -- this officer served

3In the annals of American peace time military history the dedication of
the men of SAC remains unique. It was not until the December bombing of Hanoi
during Linebacker II in 1972 that the matchless record of excellence was ended
when several B-52 crew members declined to fly.
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through two wars, Korea and Vietnam totally untouched by either.

During his

career he, his wife and their children tasted and participated in the cultures
of two foreign host states.
physical danger.

Never was this officer or any of his family in

Where was his "X" factor?

First, his wife was never happy

with or could she become reconciled to the periodic uprooting of her home and
loss of friends.

Her children were forced to change school frequently.

lived in a subculture totally comprised of the military.
was never supportive of the career of her husband.

She

Consequently, she

Was there an "X" factor

present here deserving of special pension treatment or is the situatiort described
presently being experienced by a good part of the labor force?
Or, lastly, consider the example of four young citizensoldier Marine officer candidates enrolled in the Basic Course at
Quantico, Virginia in 1967. They had volunteered for the Marine
Corps, three to fly and one to be an infantry platoon leader.
For 6 months they suffered the rigorous, physical demands, social
deprivations and isolation which at that time characterized the
free world's most demanding combat training course. On the day
before graduation one of the four went before a special board of
officers and declined his collllllission. The other three were graduated as commissioned officers; two went on to Pensacola, Florida
for flight training.while the other stayed on at Quantico for
advanced infantry training.
The first, who had declined his commission went to
Vietnam with a rifleman's MOS. During the aftermath of Tet 1968
he was killed while leading a night patrol in Quang Nam province.
The two pilots, former college roommates, remained
together flying most of a tour in 1969. One returned safely. The
other, while incoming from his last mission, a medivac rescue
flight, was shot down in flames and killed as he neared DaNang.
The fourth was attached to the 3rd Marine Division on
the DMZ. In 1971 he suffered a severe head wound in hand-to-hand
combat with North Vietnamese regulars and was returned home.4
4

These young men were once dear to the author and his wife, who was the
mother of one and the "foster mother" for a year of the other three. Their
loss is but one example among countless others of the senseless waste of war
and the culpability of old men who throughout history have sent young men to
die in them. Suffice to say, the First and Second Indochina wars, at a cost
of 3 million human beings and more than $1 trillion in treasure, decided nothing. The decolonization of Indochina was merely delayed for a few seconds of
history.
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Thus, for two of the four the
tude and for the other two it was total.

11

X11 factor was of the highest magniWhat is suggested here is simply

that within the rank and file of the military there is a great dissimilarity
of burden and risk.

The reader must confront the question for himself for

it is only within the principle of excessive risk and deprivation that a case
can be made for the justification of surplus benefits in the military retirement system.

Congressman Les Aspin covers this critical issue more succiently:

It is popular to attribute the level of military pension
to the "X" factor, otherwise described as the rigors of military
life such as long hours, risk of life and limb, assignments away
from one's family. Military life is certainly not the same as
civilian life. Therefore, there is no reason why military pay,
pensions and perquisites should be identical with the civilian
world • • . Some argue that the extra benefit is warranted by
the risk of life and limb inherent in a military career. Of
course, most of the men who see combat are one-tour soldiers who
never put in enough time to qualify for a military pension. As
for the careerists,:most Marines have certainly seen combat, but
how many Navy men, apart from aviators have? Lobbing shells at
Korea or Vietnam from a floating steel platform several miles offshore doesn't fall into the same category as the G-I chin deep in
mud with bullets whizzing overhead.5
Aspin further notes that if the added risk is deserving of extra compensation perhaps that degree of extra risk can be identified and tied directly
to extra retirement credits.

The Defense Manpower Commission Plan (Table 4-1)

briefly analyzed in Chapter III suggested, for example, that for pension purposes a career should be comprised of 30 points for 30 years of service and
that for each year in a combat status the participant would be awarded 1.5
points.

Thus, a combat soldier could be eligible for a unreduced benefit after

20 years of service.

The author strongly endorses a principle of this type and

will argue on its behalf in the concluding chapter.

5Aspin, Guns or Pension. op. cit., p. 11.
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Other elements of the military factor upon which Aspin comments
are those of frequent station changes, and separation from family.

As to

the former, many civilian jobs require frequent transfers and, of course,
many families find the opportunity to live in a variety of countries one
of the attractions of the military.

Unless the writer is mistaken, the

verse "Join the Navy and see the World" antedates World War II.
The sacrifice of separation from family, however, is another
matter and represents an area where there is relatively little comparison
with private sector employment.

But again Aspin states that even here,

within the military itself, there is a great deal of variation.
The Air Force reports that it has 22,000 plus assignments scattered about the world that are labeled unaccompanied.
This means that about 3.5% of the men and women in the Air Force
are in assignments away from their families. The Navy is different -- any shipboard assignment involves family separation.
The Navy concludes that the average male enlisted man
will spend 32.4 percent of his career away from his family due
to sea duty • • • Monetary payments could be made for family
separations, but with such variation it makes no sense to increase
pensions for everyone because some suffer extended separations.
Aspin concludes, on balance, "the military is a connnunity of more
than 2 million persons.

As in any society there are more onerous and less

onerous jobs, more desirable and less desirable assignments.
there is a specific
boiler room men.

To consider that

"X" factor is to lump military lawyers in with a ship's

We can no more stereotype the military than we can the pop-

ulation of Oregon, which is virtually the same size as our military population. 116

6 For an eloquent and enthusiastic advancement of these views, see rebuttal
to this writers CLU article by Col. Minter L. Wilson, Jr., representing the
Retired Officers Association. CLU Journal, Bryn Mawr, Penn., January 1978,
pp. 72-74.
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Subsidiary Responses
Subservient to the issue of the military "X" factor are a series
of subsidiary responses advanced by the military.

Five will be briefly

addressed and developed.
Costs as Percent of National Indices
One such issue is the allegation that the pension system is .escalating in cost at a rate little or no different from that in the private
sector and that its costs are projected to level off when taken as a percentage of the.defense budget or the GNP.

It is further suggested that the

inclusion of the cost-of-living adjustment projections, which point to the
half trillion dollar payout by the year 2000, that when that year has been
reached the cost of all products, goods and services will have inflated in
a like manner and at the same rate.
The Deferred Compensation Theory
Because of the historically low cash pay of the military, more
perceived than actual except at the lowest enlisted grades, there is also
firmly embedded in the military mind the notion that the retirement plan
consists of a method of deferred compensation and not a pension plan per se.
As deferred compensation, whatever degree of over generosity may be present

is justifiable to make up for the lack of comparability in military pay to
civilian pay.
This conviction is most keenly felt among retirees of the fifties
to middle sixties whose pensions in spite of CPI adjustments as applied during those years are relatively small in amount.

This theory was forcefully

brought home to the author when an angry letter was received in response to

72

the CLU article mentioned previously, and written by a pilot who had served
in three wars. 7

This position is not without merit.

As was stated in

Chapters I and II the compensation plan of our military has been a historical
disaster inasmuch as its personnel have never known what they actually earned.
Their compensation package consists even at present of some thirty odd items.
It has been badly communicated and explained to them and it is little wonder
that surveys have reflected both confusion and low perception levels. 8
blame

The

for this lack of comprehension should be laid squarely on the doorstep

of the DoD force managers at all levels.
The Recomputation Grievance
A third rationale from the military has to do with recomputation
which is a sensitive issue and is closely tied to the grievance discussed
above.

It is also identified in the loose classification of the perceived

"erosion of benefits" which is now prevelent in the military philosophy.
The roots of recomputation lie in the manner in which retired pay has been
adjusted during the post retirement period.

This grievance is held by

retirees of the pre-1958 period.
Prior to 1958 the retirement benefits to military retirees were
increased by a direct tie-on with the pay increases given to active duty
personnel.

This practice was halted in 1958.

Not until 1963 was legislation

passed which did permit one final recomputation and then substituted the CPI
as the pension adjustment indicator for years subsequent to 1958.

The per-

ceived inequity lies in the fact that had the old system continued the pension
7see Exhibit I in the Appendix. (i.e. letter of Major Jack B. Stowers.)
The forcefulness of Stower's remarks leaves little doubt that he perceived his
retirement plan as a contractual, albeit implied, obligation of deferred compensation, the manipulation of which would constitute a breach of faith.
Bsee Cooper. op. cit., p. 366.
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would be substantially higher than in the case under the new system because
since 1958 retired pay has grown by 230% whereas active duty pay has grown
by 430%. 9
Erosion of Benefits

An important but surely unjustified military response is that of an
"erosion of benefits".

This is a general and vague allegation.

It consists

of the erroneous view that there is currently in being an ongoing erosion of
military benefits and that present attempts to modify the retirement system are
simply a continuation of that process.
The origin of this total misconception is both insidious and mysterious.

It may have arisen as a deliberate propaganda campaign by the organized

military lobby groups to mitigate certain pension

reform.

There are some 22

different military lobby groups, associations, committees, print organs, etc.
who actively strive to maintain the status quo.

They are powerful and vocal.

The role of the three service newspapers, is instructive.

Congressman Aspin

assigns a high level of effectiveness to them, saying:
The Navy, and Army, and Air Force Times, are private publications which have won a large readership precisely because they
look after the interests of servicemen and defend every financial
redoubt. The principal officers of the various organizations are
elected and must respond to the main demands of their activists,
which is the preservation and enhancement of benefits. 1 0
Professor John B. Keeley, former career Army officer, West Point
educator, and now professor at the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the

9See Exhibit II in the Appendix in which a retired major expresses the
grievance of recomputation.
lOGuns or Pension. op. cit., p. 18.

74
University of Virginia adds, "the nation's soldiers are angry and defensive
over attempts to reduce benefits and increase efficiency.

Military employees

are retirees are organizing because their traditional defenders appear to have
deserted them. 1111

Professor Keeley noted that when medical benefits for

retirees were curtailed at Fort Lee near Petersburg, Virginia in March 1977,
"Army retirees organized a political campaign that took them all the way to
Washington to protest the cuts.

They organized and they won."

testified before the President's Commission.

Keeley later

Included in his testimony was

a reference to the Association of Air Force Sergeants, an organization which
when founded in 1970 contained 7,000 members.

The Association now has 100,000

members and has its own full-time lobbist and offices in Washington.

Keeley

asserted that the military today has a siege mentality:
The tra~ of withdrawal from the eventual fall of Vietnam,
coupled with the pardon of draft evaders, the upgrading of undesirable discharges and the vocal and strident attacks on military pay
and benefits have left a bitterness that is deeper and more serious
than is generally appreciated. We need reform, but we also need flexibility. We can't lose sight of what the military is for.1 2
llquoted in Allen Short, "Military Morale Said to be Plunnneting," Richmond
Times Dispatch, Oct. 16, 1977, Sec. C, p. 10.
12Ibid. It should not be surprising to the reader to learn that the miscalculation of Vietnam occupies such a position of prominence as a principal
cause of the deterioration of the Army. It is entirely possible that our Army,
as these words are written, has so declined in quality as a fighting force that
it can no longer be counted upon to help implement the foreign policy of the
chief executive.
It is the author's conviction, based upon the study of voluminous written
material, discourses with combat returnees, and with two of the principal civilian
policymakers of our nation during the era, that for a period of time spanning
the entire war including events leading to the fall of Saigon itself, the high
military consistently and consciously misled three successive heads of government as to both the nature of the war and the capabilities of the enemy. These
men now occupy the highest positions in the three services. Throughout the
entire war only three highly placed men, two military and one civilian, placed
their personal honor and their country over their professional careers to the
extent that they resigned and attempted to effect a withdrawal from a hopeless
cause. In 1968 Lt. Col. William Corson, Marine combat soldier-scholar, resigned
from the Corps to write the first great book of the war, The Betrayal. In 1973
the Army's most highly decorated combat soldier, Col. David Hackworth, resigned
brokenhearted over the fruitless loss of young American citizen soldiers he had
led.
Daniel Ellsberg, who saw much combat as an advisor in the pacification
program during the formative years of the war, is the third.
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Retirement Costs Stable as Percent of Budget
It is especially distasteful to see the repeated use of irrelevant
and false data and legerdemain by military spokesmen in their efforts to
defend present pension costs and project military costs in general.

A favorite

device is the comparison of the subject item, as a percentage of one of the
several natural indices, with the use of constant dollars tied to a year far
in the past.

The exchange mentioned earlier in Chapter II between Senator

Harry Byrd, Jr. and the then Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger is, again,
highly

illustr~tive.

In contrasting in constant collars the cost of his mili-

tary budget to a ten-year prior current dollar cost, Schlesinger was guilty
at the very least of a breach of professional honesty.

We must learn to insist

that the politician include the monetary effects of inflation upon the cost of
his project.when he comes to the market place for money.

In the Byrd-

Schlesinger exchange it was utterly irrelevant that the 1975 DoD budget was
relatively low in constant dollars.

What was relevant was the fact that his

source of funds was and still is the federal income tax which is itself computed
on the current income of 80,000,000 odd taxpayers -- and in which inflation
itself pushes the taxpayer into an ever increasing tax rate.
Similarly the military and almost invariably the DoD analyst, in
attempting to mask the runaway cost of the military retirement system, of ten
alleges that "in constant dollars the system will not increase as a percent of
the budget to fiscal year 2000," or whatever.
from the truth.

Factually, nothing is further

The future costs of the United States military retirement

system, if nothing is done, will escalate over the foreseeable future as will
manpower costs itself.

Total manpower costs of DoD, including inflation and

increased retirement costs are projected to sharply increase.
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Table 5-1
Defense Manpower Costs
Fiscal Year

Billions

1977
1978
1979
1980
1981

55.8
60.9
66.0
70.9
75.9
Source: CBO. Defense Manpower Commission,
Compensation Issues for Fiscal 1977.
Background Paper No. 6, April 2, 1976,
Table 11, p. 37.

Thus it may be seen that without the projected addition of the accrual fund itself which adds $7 billion to the 1979 defense budget, there will potentially
be a 36% increase in defense manpower costs over the next four years.
Within the line and staff items which comprise manpower costs, the
retirement plan costs will worsen both in terms of constant and current dollar projections.

Cooper indicates that the source of the past 20-year increase,

1956-1977, of $477 million to mroe than $8 billion, is twofold. 12

First, the

number of retirees has grown by more than 500% during these 20 years, while
the average cost per retiree has almost doubled; and secondly, the cost of
military retirement has increased from about 1% of the DoD budget to about 7%
and from approximately 4% of manpower costs to 17%.
the problem will worsen.

Moreover, Cooper adds,

Assuming that the defense budget remains level in

1978 dollars,. retirement costs are projected under current policy to grow to
more than 12% of the DoD budget by the mid 1990's.

12

Cooper, op. cit., p. 372.
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Table 5-2
Military Retirement Costs
Fiscal
Year

Retirees
(OOOs)

1956
1960
1964
1968
1972
1976
1978

183
243
411
624
867
1,108
1,180

Projections:
1978 constant dollars 1980
1985
1990
1995

1,196
1,256
1,280
1,250

Actual:
Current dollars

Cost
($ billion)

$

Percent of
DoD Budget

0.48
0.69
1. 21
2.10
3.39
7.30
9.04

1.3
1. 7
2.4
2.7
5.2
8.3
8.3

9.83
11.21
12.71
13.58

9.0
10.2
11.6
12.4

Source: Richard V. L. Cooper, op. cit.
Table 15-4, p. 375.
Thus, the reader may clearly see that the allegation by the military
of a "leveling-off" in the cost of retirement is without foundation.

This is

in spite of the fact that as the year 2000 approaches, the abnormally large
number of retirees from World War I I and Korea will leave the rolls.

Military

retirement is inordinately expensive -- not because its costs are high per se,
but because its benefits are excessive and both out of line with those of the
private sector as well with long adherred to principles of sound employee bene.
13
fi t p 1 anning.

We owe the military an adequate and reasonable level of retirement
and, as the reader will note in the concluding chapter, a better-than-average
plan for certain segments of the military.

But we do not owe all members of

13The author is in basic agreement with Professor William King's argument
in Achieving America's Goals: National Service or the All-Volunteer Armed Force.
Dr. King is pessimistic over the chances for the survival of the AVF
itself. King believes that all estimates of increased manpower costs are low
and that only through significantly higher costs will the AVF be sustained into
the 1980's.
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our military establishment of 2 million persons, 85% non-combatant, a lavish
plan with costs as a percent of pay more than 7 times that of the private
sector.

It is in this spirit and context that the subject matter for the

concluding chapter will be approached; namely, how should a just and equitable
retirement for the American military be structured?
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CHAPTER VI
Toward Rational Pension Reform

Now I would like to consider that most important aspect
of the AVF, its effectiveness. Although I have made no attempt
at assessing the military effectiveness of the Armed Forces in
either an absolute or relative sense, I do consider a number of
aspects of the current All-Volunteer Force to be indicative of
potential-effectiveness deficiencies.
Among these are: the high adverse attrition rates,
which cannot but negatively affect morale, and hence effectiveness; high rates for nonjudicial punishments, which have increased
35 percent since Vietnam era levels; survey results show that 25
to 30 percent of active enlisted personnel would try to avoid or
probably refuse to serve in combat situations, depending on the
nature of the emergency; the decreased quantity and quality of
the reserves, which serve to amplify the peace time only view
of our military forces.
Statement of Professor William King
before Senate Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, Hearings on
the All-Volunteer Armed Force,
March 2, 1977.
In general, it is of great value for the pension planner to know what
is the norm and what is the exception with regard to plan design.
not lead to mediocre or sterile plan

This does

design, but does offer to the drafts-

man the suggestion that to part from the proven way is to tread carefully.
Further, from experience one may know that once a serious design defect is in
operation in a plan, it is a delicate and frequently difficult task to rid the
plan of that defect.

This is true because the plan participants tend to look

with suspicion upon any amendment that is drafted which will affect them as
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plan participants and beneficiaries.

It is largely for these reasons that

"grandfather" or transition provisions almost always accompany a plan modification.

In Table 4-2 it may be seen, for example, that the "phase-in"

period ranges from four years for the President's Commission to twenty years
for the RMA proposals.
In pension planning it is generally known that the richness level
of the benefit formula should provide, at the conclusion of a realistic
career of employment, a retirement benefit which when added to the applicable
Social Security old age pension, is around 40 - 60% of pay as it stood just
prior to retirement, or upon some averaged period of the highest income years.
In the private sector there is a duality of obligation, delicately balanced.
First, an equitable benefit should be paid to the lorig service, faithful and
loyal employee.

Second; there is an obligation to the stockholders who have

contributed the capital for the formation of the company - employer that the
contribution (cost) level required to keep the plan actuarially sound should
be reasonable and in line with comparable levels of pension costs existing
elsewhere.

This level in the private sector would comprise as a percentage of

covered payroll something in the range of 8% to 15%.
Just as we have been concerned throughout this paper with the effect
of a retirement plan on force profile and force management -- terms used by DoD
force planners -- in the private sector there is equal concern over the effect
the plan will have upon the reduction of costly turnover.

Most of the time in

the private sector the employer desires his plan to assist him in the stabilization of the employment

patte~n. 1

In Japan, turnover of employment is practically

!This is the objective in the majority of private plans. However, the
author is presently designing a profit sharing plan for a large beverage distributorship with provisions and benefits which will result hopefully in large
voluntary severances of employment at around age 50. Past that point the physical demands upon the route salesman tend to be excessive.
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unknown among employees in the industrial corporations, contributing to both
a very low per unit cost of production and a powerful competitive position
in the international marketplace.
In private sector planning, two basic principles are well-known and
adhered to.

First, it is known that if the benefit formula provides benefits

which are high enough to support the participant at ages prior to age 65,
there will be pressure to retire early. 2

Secondly, if the vesting schedule

contains an immediate distribution provision when the vested percentage reaches
100% there will be an exodus from employment at that point with little regard
to age.

The pension planner should, therefore, tread his way carefully

through the maze of desired benefits balanced against the limits of the budgeted cost.
The reformatidn of the United States military pension system would
be child's play to any experienced pension technician if the political factor
were removed.

The simple adherence to the several basic principles enunciated

above would lead to a reasonable and rational plan providing equitable benefits.

Since, however, politics is in the last analysis the art of the possible,

military pension reform will not be rational but will consist of what is left
after an irrational period of infighting has elapsed between the executive
branch, the legislative branch and the military special interest groups.

To

2The New York City municipal plan is a recent case in point. Due to the
lavish benefit formula under which the total pension is close to 90% of current pay at age 60, the plan is now facing a high actuarial deficit from a
rash of early retirements and outmoded assumptions. Many municipal plans
throughout the nation have benefit formula richness levels in excess of the
probable ability of the taxpayers to fund them. Many if not most of them are
either unfunded or severely underfunded.
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paraphrase Congressman Aspin, "the growers of rutabagas will fight much
harder to preserve their subsidy than the 99.9% of the American people who
do not grow rutabagas will fight to abolish the subsidy."

In spite of the

near certainty that what might ultimately evolve in 1979 as the amended
military pension system will bear little resemblence to this author's recommendations, what follows is a sincere attempt to put order into a disordered
program of retirement income while at the same time attempting to solve a
larger problem of which the retirement plan is but a small part.
The Benefit Formula
The President's Commission on Military Compensation chose the benefit
formula of the federal civil service, as did Congressman Aspin in April of
1977, to provide the retirement annuities to the military.3

Under this formula

pension credits are awarded as a percentage of pay times years of service which
increases from 2% to 2.75% as years of service increase from 1 to 35.
tion

Applica-

of this formula to a realistic career will result in a benefit level very

much better than the norm that exists in the plans of private enterprise. 4
over, there is logic in a merger of this type.

First, the vast majority of all

government employees would be under the same basic benefit
toward uniformity. 5

More-

formula, a step

Second, such a merger might preempt any opportunity for the

lobby groups to allege the charge of inadequate benefits.

Third, there probably

3Supra, Chapter III.

4Supra, Chapter I. Table 1-2.
5
Members of Congress, federal judges, the chief .executive, and certain
other small groups have various other basic plans. Sid Taylor of the National
Taxpayers Union estimates the total number to be 62.
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is an "X" factor in all types of military employment, especially

among those

who are married, which is deserving of some degree of special recognition.
Under this ideal plan, however, certain segments of the uniformed
forces would be entitled to extra pension credits.

These segments would con-

sist of the holders of the combat MOS classifications and would
15%

of the total force of 2.1 million.

number 10% to

The categories would include those

of infantry, armor and amphibious duties; artillery, gunnery, rocket and missileareas; combat engineering, combat air crews, and certain seamanship

. 1 ties.
.
6
specia

The exact method in which this extra allocation should be f ac-

tored into the benefit formula is unimportant. 7
of ways this could be done.

There are an infinite number

The simplest would be an addition

in which it would be stated that for

to the formula

each year of qualified combat MOS ser-

vice, the percentage of )Jay multiplier would be increased by 50% or some such
percentage which would be acceptable and just.

It should be remembered that

the Defense Manpower Commission package recommended a bonus allocation
combat service but based on a point system.

Either method is

for

perfectly

acceptable. 8

6Preliminary results of a GAO study not yet. published and supplied to
CBO show that only 8% of the career of the average enlisted retiree was spent
in the most physically demanding jobs. Of all enlisted retirees. 80% spent
no time at all in these jobs. For officers, the survey showed the average
retiree spent 34% of his career in a job directly involving tactical operations while 30% of all officer retirees spent no time at all in such jobs.
See CBO, The Military Retirement System: Options for Change, op. cit., pp.
11-12.
7 It has been suggested that such an idea would be difficult to implement
because of the difficulty in the identification of the combat MOS -- an idea
which the author rejects as nonsense. In fiscal year 1976, for example, some
$60 million was paid to more than 25,000 enlistees as combat bonus. Presumably
some criteria were used to identify them.
8 supra, Chapter IV. Table

4-1.
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There are practical and compelling reasons for the adoption of
a weighting mechanism.

such

First, there is grave deficiency of men in the combat

arms, a deficiency projected to worsen both in numbers and in quality.

Whereas,

the cost of recruiting the least hardest to get volunteer to the average is
approximately $1,250 for DoD as a whole,

the incremental cost of the most

difficult-to-get recruit in the Army can go to $12,000.

Also the high bonus

costs which have proven to be necessary to attract recruits into

the combat

areas -- more than $60 million was paid to 25,000 recruits in fiscal year 1976,
is a further indication that even current high rates of military pay are inadequate to attract recruits into combat MOS classifications. 9

It is highly pro-

bable that there is now a critical deficiency in the qualitative makeup of the
AVF which is submerged beneath the same can-do mentality that was expressed by
the high ranking military during Vietnam, in

the form of misleading and false

declarations of "light at the end of the tunnel. 11
little in time of national

We must be prepared to expect

crisis or danger from the thousands of present day

combat personnel who joined the force for a monetary night's lodging.

The

disbursement of a combat bonus does not beget the quality of patriotism.
This writer believes, as does a growing body of critics, that the
All-Volunteer
value should
force of arms.
or what

Army is essentially a peace time force which would be

of little

it be called upon to project the foreign policy of the nation by
10

The military retirement plan, no matter how it is designed

it provides, will not remake the armed services -- only a fool would

9

senate Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel of the Committee on Armed
Services, The All-Volunteer Armed Force, op. cit., p. 8.
10

See the recent 377 page study by Rep. Robin Beard, R-Tenn, on the lack
of combat readiness of the AVF. See especially Senate Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, The All-Volunteer Armed Force, op. cit., pp. 1-55.
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think as much, although many of

the highest military have

indicated that

substantive modification would destroy it.

But perhaps the combat weighting

device would encourage substantial numbers

of careerists to volunteer for

high risk service.
forces.

This latter idea is not new among other modern day armed

The French for instance, weight

their plan for campaigns.

in the armed forces of the Soviet Union, however, that maximum use
retirement plan is made for hazardous duty credit.

It is
of

the

The Soviet military

has

a retirement system which has strong overtones of the Defense Manpower Commission package in
formula. 11

the manner in which combat service is fed into

There the plan is designed to

the benefit

exert a maximum influence where,

in the Russian mind apparently, it is most needed and deserved -- namely the
special risk categories.

In the best tradition of sound pension design, its

provisions are simple and direct:
Officer Kotov served from September 1936 to October 1938
and from June 1941 through August 1971. From July 1942 to April
1958 he was on flying status, including the period May 1943 to
February 1945 at the front, and from June 1945 to December 1952 on
isolated Kanchatka Penninsula. Thus, he actually served for thirty
two years and three months.
His one year and nine months at the front counts triple.
His time on Kanchatka counts double, but only after September 1945.
His flying time counts time and a half. Adding it all up he has
forty-six earned years for his pension. He will get fifty percent
of his last pay for serving twenty-five years, plus three percent
for each extra year up to seventy-five percent of his last pay.12
Sad to say, the President's Commission did not see fit to include in
its recommendations this badly needed device.

Overall, there is no contradic-

tion in the awarding of dissimilar credits to different groups within the

11op. cit., DMC Study, Table 4-1.
12Harriet Fast Scott, "The Military Profession in the Soviet Union,"
Air Force Magazine, March 1976. p. 81.
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military -- and the integrated, excess type plans of private industry.

There,

one level of pension credit is given on compensation not exceeding the Social
Security wage base; and another, higher level is given on compensation above
the wage base.

The granting of extra credits to combat personnel reflects a

somewhat similar philosophy.
Secondary Plan Provisions
In pension design, once the benefit formula and eligibility provisions have been defined and tested, and after computerized projections have
yielded the necessary cost projections, the secondary provisions can be added.
Here, the ideal military plan could contain the provisions of several of the
reform packages enunciated in Chapter IV and summarized in Tables 4-1 and 4-2.
Most would

ag~ee

that the ideal plan should be integrated with Social

Security, indeed it is wasteful and inequitable if it should not.

Most would

agree that short service personnel should have access to benefits at service
separation
in Table 4-4.

perhaps along the lines suggested by the Commission and described
To fail to do so would result in an inequity.

A more difficult

question is that of whether the new plan should be contributory.

That since

the benefit formula is similar to that of the civil service plan and since the
civilian federal employee contributes 7% of
should not his military counterpart?
should not:

his pay towards his cost, why

There are at least three reasons why he

first, to suggest a contribution would raise the spectre of a

further erosion of benefits;
and secure a pay increase

second, the military constituency would request

~qual

to the contribution; and third, on an actuarial

basis the 7% contribution is quantitavely meaningless.
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As to the commencement date of the annuity, the recommendations of
the Carter Commission are superb.

As quoted in the epigraph of Chapter IV,

by delaying the commencement of old age annuities until age 55 at the earliest,
the quick "20 and out" pension has been effectively eliminated.

This leaves

for consideration the two most difficult questions:
(1) What is the obligation of the nation to the military retiree
for the period between his actual retirement and the commencement of his annuity?
(2) Can the nation, in the new climate of 5%

9% inflation, continue

to protect the_military retiree from the declining purchasing power of ·the
dollar?
The Deferred Compensation Trust Fund
The President's Commission introduced a new and very expensive trust
fund to be created for two purposes.

First, it is intended to assist separated

personnel in their transition to civilian employment, and second to furnish a
source of income during the "blackout period" from date of separation to the
commencement of the old age military annuity beginning at the earliest at 55.

13

While this feature is new, there has always been in effect a severance pay for
involuntarily separated officers which has provided substantial sums.14

The

Commission plan would extend this benefit to enlisted men.
A search of the available data bearing upon transitory benefits such
as the deferred compensation fund in the military plans of other states reveals
nothing of comparable scope or magnitude. 15
13 Supra, Chapter 4.
14

Supra, Chapter 4.

Nor did the Commission in its full

Table 4-3.
Table 4-4.

15 u. s. Department of Defense. The Third Quadrennial Review of Military
Compensation. Vol. IX. Sample Foreign Pay Systems. December 1976. Washington, D. C.

88
report see fit to offer a citation to any precedent.

The citizenry is thus

left, should the Carter Commission recommendations be implemented, of providing benefits reaching higher than $150,000 for a departing officer in
addition to a severance pay allowance of possibly more than $32,000.

The

Federal Republic of Germany, whose military retirement plan contains a maximum
pension as a percentage of pay of 75%, has a separation allowance based on
years of service times 3/4 pay.16
Years of Service

Allowance Times 3/4 Pay

4 - 6
6 -

8

8 - 12

Over 12

6 months
1 year
1 1/2 years
3 years

Thus, our chief NATO ally pays at a maximum the sum equal to three times 3/4
annual pay as a transitfon benefit.17
Canada pays a sum much lower.

The Canadian model is a gratuity for

under 10 years of service equal to 1/2 weekly salary times years of service.
For service of 10 - 20 years, the gratuity consits of weekly salary times years
of service.18 Of the eight states analyzed, six have some kind of transition
allowance while the practice of Sweden is unknown.

Again, the ideal plan

would contain an equitable but not excessive allowance.
that

Commission data reveal

some 85% of American military retirees require no more than 12 months to

16 Ibid.
17
18

Ibid.

rbid. The Third Qqadrennial Review contains voluminous but incomplete
data for the military forces of U. S., U. K., Canada, Federal Republic of
Germany, Sweden, Japan, France and Australia.
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locate new work. 19

If this is true the allowance of up to $182,000 for a

transition of such short duration is excessive.

Private industry gives to

involuntarily separated wage earners perhaps two weeks' pay and executives
no more than six months' salary.

Clearly then the recommendations of the

Carter Commission are excessive in this area.
lated in any previous major reform package.

Such a fund was never postuThe magnitude of the recommenda-

tions have no basis in either logic or equity.
Cost-of-Living Adjustments
The reader has been treated by now to an unambiguous position, a
firmly taken stand on the question of the continuation of the CPI indexed
cost-of-living adjustments for the American military.

The Carter Commission,

in recommending the continuation of this protection, did so briefly and succinctly with a very incomplete rationale. 20

In a 205-page report, it devoted

but 14 lines to the most expensive single component of the American military
retirement plan; for even under the very modest inflation projection of 5%,
some $292 billion will be paid out between 1975 and 2000 due to the CPI
index tie-on to the military retirees alone.
The question is, what is the identity of the rationale, the moral
or logical justification for the luxury of such a device for four million
federal employees, divided approximately between the military and civilian
civil service?

There can be no question of the inequity for the one half

of the American labor force who pays 98% of the military pension costs and who
are themselves without private pension coverage of any description.

19Report of the President's Commission, op. cit., pp. 36-37.
20ibid., p. 66.
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Largely because of the generous inflationary adjustments to current
wages and salaries of the federal establishment plus the automatic adjustments
to both the military and civilian retirement community in the area, Washington
has become the highest per capita income city in the nation.
hold income of $28,000 per year.

It has a house-

One fourth of the total work force of the

area is federally employed with an average income of $20,000. 21

It has been

estimated that due to the complex manner in which federal pay has been based
on the idea of "comparability", there is now a federal wage advantage of as
much as 20%.
If there are to be savings from the ultimate modification of the
military retirement there must be a reduction or curtailment of benefits.
Most of the alternates illustrated in Tables 4-1 and 4-2 project savings only
far into the future and:relatively small sums until the turn of the century.
It is difficult and perhaps even inequitable to cut or curtail benefits for
those personnel who presently are in the force or on the retired rolls.

While

this is true of most of the types of benefits present in a retirement plan it
should not be germane to the decoupling of the CPI index from the pensions of
either military or civilian civil service retirees.

What was merely unwise

in the era of 3% annual inflation is highly dangerous in times of 9% inflation.
It is the magnitude and manner of this type of inflation protection that is
unique.
21
There is evidence of public resentment directed at both the opulence and
power of the federal bureaucracy and ostentatiousness of Washington. For
example, Harpers magazine recently devoted its cover story to the wealth of the
capital city. (Tom Bethell, "The Weal.th of Washington," Harpers, June 1978.
p. 48) See especially a superb discussion of the inequity of the percentage
principle in inflationary wage increases for the federal civil servant in Newsweek,
"Our Unfair Pay Raises," March 13, 1978, p. 19. There, author Paul E. Mullinax
argues for a flat amount principle as did military retiree Everett H. Clark in
Exhibit III of the Appendix, as a more equitable and economical manner to compensate for inflation.
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In the last analysis, however, no one should without qualification
predict the future course of a sensitive political issue such as military
pension reform.

It was thought, for example, that Congress would address

the issue during the second session of 1977.

However, the Congress had been

flooded with legislation introduced by an over zealous executive branch.

As

mentioned earlier, it was in April of 1977 that Congressman Les Aspin introduced his "trial balloon" in a floor motion and it was noted at that time
that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had privately urged the subcommittee members
to delay pension reform for another year because of critical morale problems
and the threat of military unionization.

It is now possible, however, that

more serious events have overtaken pension reform, namely the state of the
All-Volunteer Army itself.

The reader has noticed the secondary theme,

implicitly and explicitly expressed throughout this thesis, that the future
of the AVF is clouded and that its days are numbered.

There is a distinct

possibility that the Joint Chiefs have understated the deterioration of the
service arms and that the armed forces cannot in the immediate future survive simultaneously a radical reorganization accompanied by a complete or
partial return to the draft -- and a revision of the military pension system.22
It is not a pleasant thought.

22on June 25, Senator Harry Byrd, ranking member of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, released a statement to the principal newspapers of
Virginia. This news release coincided with completion of the last half of
the final chapter of the author's thesis. Senator Byrd stated that he is
now experiencing grave doubts as to the viability of the AVF -- citing rising
manpower costs, high cost of recruitment, excessive attrition, etc. The
sense of his article was to the effect that alternatives to the AVF were
being investigated and that the possibility exists that a return to the
draft or some form of national services would be necessitated. (Senator
Harry F. Byrd, Jr., "Volunteerism Isn't Working," Richmond Times Dispatch,
June 25, 1978, Sec. G, p. 7.)
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ROBERT L. DUNN
Special Representative
P.O. BOX 85
ROSSVILLE. GEORGIA 30741
PHONE: (615) 266-6795 RES. (404) 866-2038

Mr,
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253
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Shelton Clarke, Jr.
Home Life Insurance Company
Broadway
York, New York 10007

12 October 1977

Dear Mr. Clarke:
Your excellent article entitled, "The United States Military Pension System - To Halt
A Runaway," appearing in the October 1977 issue ofC,L,U, was most interesting to me
for two reasons: (1) I am a-Military Retiree and (2) I am a Professional Life Underwriter.
In June 1963, I retired from USAF with twenty-seven years service with the rank of Major.
Sixty days prior to my retirement the Congress made a major change in the Military
Retirement Law. That drastic change as of now reduces by $4,800,00 my annual annuity.
That drastic reduction of benefits occurred at the end of a long career during a period
when the WWII personnel hump was retiring. To place that drastic reduction of benefits
in sharp focus, a Chief Master Sergeant with the same length of service retiring today
receives benefits equal to mine, If the Cost of Living Index had not been included in
the Act of 1963, my annuity would be about equal to a Buck Sergeant retiring today.
Will the Pension Reform Act of 1974 permit a Pension Plan which has been effect for
twenty-seven years to make drastic reductions in benef tis the year a large number of
covered personnel are scheduled to retire? Would the Congress even consider drastic
reductions in Social Security Benefits the year an extremely large number of citizens
retire? I do not think so. Should the people of the United States be less fair with
their Military Personnel who have Borne the Battle?
You are aware of the fact that for the past several years the Military Retiree has lost
significant benefits.
It seems to me that Retired Military Personnel deserve to be able to plan with confidence
for their golden years without having to worry about more benefits being taken from them
on a month to month basis.
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THE BANKERS LI FE

ROBERT L. DUNN
Special Representative
P. 0. BOX 85
ROSSVILLE, GEORGIA 30741
PHONE: (615) 266-0795 RES. (404) 866-2038

Mr. Shelton Clarke, Jr.

11 October 1977

- conti.nued -

Would you please take the time to explain to me how you propose to deal with the
problem of the Pre 19"64 Military Retiree? I will be most grateful for your thoughts
on that problem.

Sincerely,
,,,

,.· /'

>-, ,, .. ,, , / - •
,/'

t

...

-<.,.

-

"' ...

~

/

.:.

,. Robert L. Dunn

.....

__

P,S. If a Military Retiree pays more in Federal Income taxes than he receives in a
Military Annuity, is he really costing his fellow citizens anything? It would be
interesting to know the total amount of Federal and State Income Taxes paid by all
Military Retirees, If you deducted that amount from the total cost of the program,
wouldn't you really have the true cost of the Military Retirement Program?
CF:
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·L·etters to the E
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Cost-of-Living R_aises: Windfall or Pittan~e
.To the Editor:

As a citizen f am disturbed by the
spread of the cost-of-living adjustment
(COLA) .. into labor unions a.Dd now
into the salaries of judges, top officials
of the executive branch and probaibly
Congressmen. . ·' _. •.
Although benefiting from it myself
a.s a miliwy ·re~. l have become
convinced that it is essentially a give. away program_ which~ dispenses too
·..
. much to those who don't need it and
, not enough to .those who- do..
.,
..
~·-~.The application at· pea:entaoe. in- .• - .. :
· =.•.creases in the Consumer: Priee.,Index .
..'·. '(C-P.I.) : aaoss Federal
scales, ~ · '..·".:-:~ ·
.
: high and ·1ow,. is .an undeserv~ and · · .·
- ···.
·
. excessive Windfall for the above.aver- : "bigh end can
a!!ard to Ji.ave it.
e.ge and an. un!.a.ir. pittance . ,the . . that way. . . . .
.
lower· end.. : · ·· .-···:~ _. ·. ·.~ :;/..__.,:· ··.. : . The present di.scrlminating and unA 5 pereent increase'. iii' the · C-P.L : · bal~ccd ~djustments are highly . ll!would raise a Congressional salary by . fiaoonary 1.11 themselves. Labor Bureau
$186 a montho enough to pay for aU ·. su.tisti~ quoted -?Y The Tu_nes last
groceries and basic needs,. not-just- ,.,_July gave COLA figures veenng from
the inflationary extra, bur 'woWd 'give - .22 C1!llts an hour to Sl.05; that's from .
the S150 Social Security . beneficiary · $8.~o. to S42. a : w~k l>f forty ~ours,
only $7.50, not even enough for one a ndiculous indication of the kmd of
fJ.lling of the ga.s t.aJlk of his jalopy, if · ea>nomic football ~e _device has
he owns one....
'.. - . ·. , . · · •
become. ·
.·
·· ·· · .. ·
.
The fact is that the c.P.L has a · ·In my own.~· I "have t>een gla_d
•reverse relationship to salary level. . to get these rais~s. B1:1t enough is
and the tragedy is that when each enough, and 1 don t~ bel~eve .the genis expressed in percenta.ge"it is easy ~ really need their grant increase9-·
.to ·slide into the assumption that the while the se~eants have to scramble
more pay you get and spend. the mon: fo~ p~st-ret.irement. Jobs Ol" go on
compensation you need to stay caught re!Aietf.
n .
. r b
u
·
a guess.. a at mc.rease o a out
•
p. . .
$20 a month would be ample for every·- This 1s n~ense.1 Who says th~ al- body to cover ~ actual ~ after
fluent need it?
.
. ' .·a 5 percent c.P.L rise. Anything above
What needs to be said. and loudly. . that is just. money thrown out to
is that my cost-of-living adjustment ·people who don't need it.
should be a fiat rate a.cross the board
·
"'"· EVUEIT H. CL.UU<:
because_ the low _epd needs it and !-!le
.. TtmkhaMock, Pa.. Sept. 12, 1976 ..,

,
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.

··-·-·
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SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

The following bibliography is select in the sense that it lists
those sources that contributed measurably to the foregoing narrative.
With one exception, these primary sources were written within the last
two years. The cited works are not large numerically. However, the books,
reports, papers and studies which comprise them were carefully chosen. As
of the time when it became necessary to "close down" the research for this
theses it was felt that the most authoritative collection of source material
had been assembled. That time came in April 1978 when the Report of the
President's Connnission on Military Compensation was released.
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